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POVERTY AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: A MORE 
COHERENT APPROACH? 
EuGENIA McGILL* 
Abstract: The collapse of trade negotiations in Canc(m in September 
2003 shook confidence in both the Doha Development Agenda and the 
commitments of industrialized countries and international economic 
institutions to pursue "coherent" trade and development policies. This 
Article critically examines the dual commitments of development 
institutions, especially the World Bank, to trade liberalization and 
poverty reduction, and the challenges to achieving "policy coherence" 
through trade "mainstreaming," "capacity building," and "impact 
assessments." In particular, the Article considers the feasibility of 
adapting existing tools for poverty and social analysis to assess trade 
policies and agreements. The Article uses gender as one possible lens 
through which to analyze the potential impacts of trade policies on 
vulnerable groups in developing countries. While recognizing their 
limitations, the Article supports the development of practical tools for 
poverty and social analysis for use by government trade offices and 
other ministries, development institutions, research institutes, and civil 
society groups in developing countries. However, for these tools to be 
useful, developing countries must have the "policy space" to choose the 
trade policy options that best support their poverty reduction strategies 
and broad development goals. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference/of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WfO) in Doha in November 2001, including the adoption of a 
Work Programme now referred to as the "Doha Development Agenda" 
*Consultant to international and non-governmental organizations on law and social 
development issues. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, M.I.A., Columbia University. This 
Article is based on a paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the International 
Economic Law Group of the American Society of International Law, "Interrelationships: 
International Economic Law and Developing Countries-Panel on Developing Countries, 
International Economic Law and Development," Oct. 4-6, 2002, Washington, D.C. I am 
grateful to Constance Wagner and the other participants in the IELG panel on "Develop-
ing Countries, International Economic Law and Development" for their helpful com-
ments. 
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(DDA), recast the built-in agenda and new activities of the WTO in 
terms of developing countries and their concerns in the global trading 
system. The DDA also extended the principle of "coherence in global 
economic policy-making," which is embedded in the Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO, to include human development concerns such as 
public health. However, the breakdown of trade negotiations at the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September 2003 has shaken 
confidence in both the DDA and the broader notion of coherence in 
international policy. In particular, the unwillingness of major industrial-
ized countries to dismantle their agricultural subsidies highlights the 
incoherence between their trade policies and international develop-
ment commitments. Not surprisingly, similar tensions can be found in 
the policy frameworks and activities of international organizations over 
which these countries have significant influence, particularly the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional devel-
opment banks, as well as the countries' own aid agencies. 
The DDA suggests several related channels through which coun-
tries and development institutions can pursue coherent approaches to 
trade and development. These include support for (1) "mainstreaming" 
trade into the national development plans and poverty reduction strate-
gies of developing countries, (2) trade-related "capacity building" in 
these countries, and (3) assessing the development impact of particular 
trade policies, especially on poor and vulnerable groups. Part I of this 
Article reviews the DDA in the context of general trends in international 
development assistance. Part IT critically examines the dual commit-
ments of development institutions, especially the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), to trade liberalization and 
poverty reduction, and the challenges to achieving "policy coherence" 
through trade "mainstreaming," "capacity building," and "impact as-
sessments." Part ill considers the feasibility of adapting existing tools for 
poverty and social analysis to assess trade policies and rules. Finally, Part 
N uses gender as one possible lens through which to analyze trade poli-
cies and agreements and their possible impacts on vulnerable groups in 
developing countries. 
This Article argues that a comprehensive poverty and social analy-
sis of trade policy should consider social, economic, and le-
gal/regulatory factors. Legal/regulatory analysis can also help to iden-
tify areas of tension between international economic law, on the one 
hand, and other legal frameworks that promote development goals, 
such as gender equality, on the other. The development of tools for 
poverty and social analysis of trade policies and rules can improve the 
quality of development agencies' advice and assistance to developing 
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countries. More importantly, these tools can be used by trade negotia-
tors, other government officials, research institutes, and civil society 
groups in developing countries to inform national debates about the 
proper role oftrade in national development strategies. 
I. DoHA, CANCUN, AND DEVELOPMENT AssiSTANCE 
A. The Doha Development Agenda 
Development concerns are not new to the WTO or the global 
trading system. Building on language in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement Establishing the WTO rec-
ognizes the shared goals of wro members in "raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development," as well as the "need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least 
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic develop-
ment."1 Although the concept of "development" and the ascribed 
categories of "developing country" and "least developed country" 
(LDC) remain contested,2 they are nonetheless woven into the fabric 
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
pmbl., 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)[hereinafter WTO Agreement). 
2 See generally ARTURO EscOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UN-
MAKING OF THE THIRD WoRLD (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1995) (deconstructing "devel-
opment" as a "historically produced discourse" rooted in particular Western concepts of tra-
dition, modernity, and progress). The Charter of the United Nations, created in 1945, refers 
to the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development," U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. a, while the Arti-
cles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
was created in 1944 and began operations in 1946, refer to "the encouragement of the devel-
opment of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries," INTERNATIONAL 
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. I, para. i. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Develop-
ment Association-a related entity established in 1960 to provide financing on more flexible 
terms to less-developed countries-form what is commonly known as the "'World Bank." Over 
the last decade, several related concepts have emerged from international conferences and 
the policies of development agencies, including "social development," "human develop-
ment," "sustainable development," and "participatory development." Classifications of coun-
tries as "developed," "developing," and "least developed" are similarly contested and fluid 
and can vary from one context to another. Within the WTO, for example, there are no 
definitions of "developed" and "developing," and a new member country's status depends on 
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of the WTO. The development theme is most evident in provisions of 
various WTO agreements granting "special and differential" treat-
ment to developing or least developed members,3 and in the opera-
tion of the WTO Committee on Trade and Development and Sub-
Committee on Least-Developed Countries. 
The characterization of the outcome of the Doha Ministerial 
Conference as a "Development Agenda" was not an afterthought. The 
failure to launch a new round of trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999 
had been attributed in large part to the dissatisfaction of many devel-
oping countries with their experience in implementing the Uruguay 
Round agreements. Moreover, by 2001, the majority of WTO mem-
bers were developing countries.4 It was apparent to all members and 
to the WTO Secretariat that further progress would not be made at 
Doha unless developing country concerns were addressed in some 
fashion. The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the opera-
tion of the WTO system had also found support among prominent 
economists,5 the World Bank and other development agencies,6 and a 
broad spectrum of civil society groups in both industrialized and de-
veloping nations.7 
the outcome of its accession negotiations with existing members. In contrast, the WfO's 
recognition of "least developed" countries is based on the designation of countries as such 
within the United Nations system. See World Trade Organization, Who Are the Developing 
Countries in the WfO?, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htrn 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
3 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM: PAsT AND PRESENT 18-22 (Background Note for High-Level Symposium 
on Trade and Development, Mar. 17-18, 1999), available at http:/ /www.wto.org/eng-
lish/ tratop_e/ devel_e/bkgdev _e.doc. 
4 WfO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration, Wf/MIN(Ol)/ 
DEC/I, para. 2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]. 
5 See DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES: MAKING 
OPENNESs WoRK 147-50 (1999). See generally]. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implemen-
tation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 THE WoRLD EcoN. 511 
(2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Coun-
tries in jr01n the Cold, 23 THE WoRLD EcoN. 437 (2000); Asoke Mukerji, Developing Countries 
and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. WoRLD TRADE 33 (2000) (author was Indian 
government delegate to the wro in 1995-98). 
6 See generally WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE POOR (2001); UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TRADE MATTERS: ELIMINATING WoRLD PoVERTY (2001), 
http:/ /www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/tradematters.pdf; United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreements of Relevance to the Agricul-
ture Sector: Winners and Losers, at http:/ /www.fao.org/trade/docs/ur.htrn (last visited Apr. 
25, 2004). 
7 See generally AMERICAN LANDS ALLIANCE ET AL., FEDERAL REGISTER COMMENTS ON US 
POSITION REGARDING QATAR MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
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The Ministerial Declaration of the Doha Conference asserted 
that developing countries' "needs and interests [would be] at the 
heart of the Work Programme" included in that document, and that 
"the marginalization of least-developed countries in international 
trade" would be addressed.8 Developing country concerns were 
reflected most prominently in the separately-adopted Declaration on 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and Public Health9 and the decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.to However, developing 
country interests were also mentioned in provisions of the main Min-
isterial Declaration relating to agriculture, services, market access, 
investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, subsidies and coun-
tervailing measures, environment, small economies, debt and finance, 
technology transfer, technical cooperation and capacity building, 
LDCs, and special and differential treatment. 11 
The initial reactions of WTO members to the DDA ranged from 
jubilant to disappointed, and commentators' initial assessments were 
similarly mixed.12 One academic commentator found evidence in the 
DDA that the WTO might be starting to transform itself into an or-
ganization that respects distributive as well as efficiency values.13 An-
(2001), available at http:/ /www.ciel.org/Publications/FRNQatarCommentsFinal.pdf; THE 
CouNCIL oF CANADIANS, OuR WoRLD Is NoT FOR SALE: WTO-SHRINK OR SINK (2001), 
available at http:/ /www.canadians.org; DANISH '92 GROUP & DANISH NoRTH/SouTH CoALI-
TION, WTO AFTER SEATTLE: PUT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ON THE AGENDA! (2d ed. 
2001), available at http:/ /www.92grp.dk/inenglish/hovedsid.htm; PENNY FowLER, OxFAM 
INTERNATIONAL, HARNESSING TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT (2001), available at http://www. 
oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp01_trade.pdf; INTERNATIONAL GEN-
DER AND TRADE NETWORK (IGTN), INTERNATIONAL GENDER AND TRADE NETWORK AT DoHA 
(2001), available at http:/ /www.igtn.org/WTO/IGTN_WTO.pdf; THIRD WoRLD NETWORK, 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ThE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: A DE-
VELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (2001); LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE OR-
GANIZATION? CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY (1999). 
8 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, paras. 2-3. 
9 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001). 
1° WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Implementation-Related Issues and Con-
cmzs, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001). 
11 See generally Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4. 
12 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, Comment on the Doha Ministerial, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 191 
(2002); see also Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 469, 469-70 (2002); Inaamul 
Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the Momentum of Multilateralism and Developing 
Countries, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1097,1100-01 (2002). 
13 Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformation: The WTO as a Redistributive Organization, 17 
AM. u. INT'L L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2002). 
376 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:371 
other was less optimistic, noting that the DDA had resolved only two 
substantive trade law issues of interest to developing countries, and 
that at Doha "the can was [simply] kicked down the road."14 
Subsequent events confirmed the skeptics' fears. By fall of 2003, 
when the Fifth Ministerial Conference was to take place in Cancun, 
little progress had been made on the Doha commitments of most in-
terest to developing countries. The only tangible advance-a WTO 
General Council decision allowing some flexibility in the application 
of the compulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS Agreement-
emerged only in late August 2003, and after months of protracted 
debate and negotiation.J5 The Cancun Ministerial Conference 
commenced on September 10, despite wide differences among 
country groups, especially on agriculture and the so-called "Singapore 
issues." The chairperson closed the conference abruptly on 
September 14, when there appeared to be an impasse over the 
"Singapore issues," and wide gaps remained in country positions on 
agriculture .16 
From a developing country perspective, however, Cancun funda-
mentally changed the dynamics of multilateral trade relations. For the 
first time, several negotiating blocks of developing countries emerged-
notably, the so-called Group of 20 and the Alliance for Special Products 
and Special Safeguard Mechanisms-and some of these coalitions con-
tinued to act in the informal trade discussions that resumed in late 
2003.17 In addition, despite the breakdown of negotiations in Cancun, 
there is little question that trade discourse continues to be colored by 
the development perspective introduced at Doha. Regardless of their 
underlying interests, trade negotiators and other interested parties are 
now far more likely to couch their proposals and responses in terms of 
the likely benefits or harms to developing countries. 
14 Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam and Doha: Unmet Challenges Facing American Trade Law, 36 
lNT'L LAW. 159, 165 (2002). 
15 WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPSAgreementandPttblicHealth, WT/L/540 (Sept.1, 2003). 
16 WTO Ministerial Conference, Fifth Session, Draft Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN 
(03)/W/24 (Sept. 14, 2003); World Trade Organization, Day 5: Conference Ends Without 
Consensus (Sept. 14, 2003), at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min03_ 
e/min03_14sept_e.htm. The "Singapore issues" include investment, competition, govern-
ment procurement, and trade facilitation. 
17 BRIDGES WKLY. ThAnE NEws DIG., Dec. 17, 2003, at 3-4, 6-7, http://www. 
ictsd.org/weekly I. 
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B. Trends in Development Assistance for Trade Liberalization 
The international financial institutions, including the IMF and 
MDBs, as well as a number of United Nations (U.N.) bodies and 
agencies and bilateral aid agencies, have been involved in trade pro-
motion or trade liberalization for some time. Indeed, the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in 
1964 as the principal organ of the U.N. General Assembly dealing 
with trade, investment, and development issues, and as the U.N. focal 
point for LDCs.18 The IMF's trade-related activities are somewhat spe-
cialized and relate to both its surveillance of member countries' ex-
change rate policies and its extension of balance-of-payments support 
through credits and loans.19 The trade-related activities of the MDBs, 
the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and bilateral aid agen-
cies are more closely related, although they reflect different modali-
ties of assistance (in particular, the MDBs provide loans as well as 
grants) and have evolved significantly over time. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and ·Development 
(OECD) has identified four phases or trends in trade-related devel-
opment assistance: 
• Export marketing (1970s); 
• Trade liberalization ( 1980s and early 1990s); 
• Trade facilitation; and 
• Trade capacity building.2o 
Not surprisingly, the trends in trade-related development assistance 
reflect general trends in development assistance. This is particularly 
evident in the World Bank's trade-related lending in the 1980s and 
1990s, which included not only investment loans to build facilities, 
such as ports and export corridors, and to support export industries, 
but also a significant number of structural adjustment loans that in-
cluded trade liberalization conditions. By its own count, between 1981 
and 1994, the World Bank supported trade or foreign exchange policy 
18 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), UNCTAD 
IN BRIEF 1 (2001), available at http:/ /www.unctad.org/en/docs/ /poedmd117.en.pdf. 
19 See generally Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF /WTO Relationship: The Fund's 
Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 561 (2002); Dukgeun Ahn, 
Linkages Between International Financial and Trade Institutions: IMF, World Bank and WTO, 34 
]. WoRLD TRADE 1 (2000). 
20 ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), DAC 
GUIDELINES: STRENGTHENING TRADE CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT 23 (2001), http://www. 
oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 46/60/2672878.pdf. 
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reforms through 238 loans.21 (This lending preceded the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round and resulted in much of the "autonomous lib-
eralization" that developing countries have argued they should be 
given credit for in current WTO negotiations.) From 1994 to 1999, 
World Bank investment lending for trade-related activities repre-
sented about 26% of its total lending. Between 1990 and 1998, 68% of 
the World Bank's acljustment loans included support for trade and 
exchange rate policy reforms.22 
C. Recent International Commitments to Poverty Reduction 
The commitment ofWTO members at Doha to prioritize develop-
ing country needs and interests in the implementation of the Uruguay 
Round agreements and new trade negotiations is understandable in 
light of other recent international commitments and trends in devel-
opment assistance. In particular, the Millennium Declaration, adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in September 2000, asserted that "the 
central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes 
a positive force for all the world's people. For while globalization offers 
great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, 
while its costs are unevenly distributed."23 In discussing development, 
the Millennium Declaration emphasized the need to address "the ab-
ject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more 
than a billion [people] are currently subjected," and resolved "to create 
an environment-at the national and global levels alike-which is con-
ducive to development and to the elimination of poverty. "24 The Mil-
lennium Declaration went on to commit all members of the U.N. to 
several time-bound and continuing goals, now referred to as the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs). These include: reducing by half 
the proportion of the world's people living on less than one dollar a 
day; ensuring universal access to primary school and equal access of 
girls and boys to all levels of education; reducing maternal mortality by 
three-quarters and under-five child mortality by two-thirds; and halting 
and reversing the spread of HIV I AIDS, malaria, and other widespread 
diseases, all by 2015.25 Continuing goals include: 
2! WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES ON INTERNATIONAL 
'IRADE IsSUES para. 3 (1999). 
22 Id. para. 28. 
23 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 8th 
plen. mtg., Agenda Item 60(b), para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000). 
24 Id. paras. 11-12. 
25 Id. para. 19. 
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• To promote gender equality and the empowerment of 
women as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger, and 
disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustain-
able[;] 
• To develop and implement strategies that give young peo-
ple everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive 
work[;] 
• To encourage the pharmaceutical industry to make essen-
tial drugs more widely available and affordable by all who 
need them in developing countries[;] 
• To develop strong partnerships with the private sector and 
with civil society organizations in pursuit of development 
and poverty eradication.26 
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Among other things, the Millennium Declaration laid the groundwork 
for the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
adopted by WTO members in Doha. 
Less than a year after Doha, the international community con-
vened again for the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment in Monterrey. The Monterrey Consensus adopted at the con-
ference confirmed that the international community would give 
priority to "[m]obilizing and increasing the effective use of financial 
resources and achieving the national and international economic con-
ditions needed to fulfill internationally agreed development goals, in-
cluding those contained in the Millennium Declaration, to eliminate 
poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and pro-
tect our environment."27 The Monterrey Consensus reaffirmed U.N. 
members' commitment to trade liberalization, but noted that develop-
ing countries need "appropriate institutions and policies" to benefit 
fully from trade, and welcomed the emphasis in the DDA on giving 
priority to developing countries' needs and interests.28 
The Monterrey Consensus committed U.N. members to "improve 
[their] domestic policy coherence through the continued engage-
ment of [their] ministries of development, finance, trade and foreign 
affairs, as well as ... central banks."29 To complement national devel-
26 Id. para. 20. 
27 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CoNFERENCE ON fiNANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT, 
MoNTERREY MEXIco, 18-22 MAR. 2002, ch. l, para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/ll, U.N. 
Sales No. 02.11.A.7 (2002), available at http:/ /www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconf198-ll.doc [here-
inafter MoNTERREY CoNSENsus]. 
28 Id. paras. 26-27. 
29 Id. para. 70. 
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opment efforts, the Consensus also recognized "the urgent need to 
enhance coherence, governance, and consistency of the international 
monetary, financial and trading systems" and encouraged "policy and 
programme coordination of international institutions and coherence 
at the operational and international levels to meet the Millennium 
Declaration development goals of sustained economic growth, poverty 
eradication and sustainable development."30 Turning to the role of 
the multilateral financial institutions, the Consensus stressed the need 
in providing policy advice and financial support, to work on 
the basis of sound, nationally owned paths of reform that 
take into account the needs of the poor and efforts to re-
duce poverty, and to pay due regard to the special needs and 
implementing capacities of developing countries and coun-
tries with economies in transition, aiming at economic 
growth and sustainable development. The advice should take 
into account social costs of adjustment programmes, which 
should be designed to minimize negative impact on the vul-
nerable segments of society.31 
Even before the adoption of the Millennium Declaration and 
MDGs, the World Bank and most regional development banks, as well 
as a number of bilateral aid agencies, had already redefined their mis-
sions in terms of poverty reduction. The World Bank's reorientation 
toward poverty reduction coincided with the launch of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) by the World Bank and the 
IMF.32 This initiative came about in response to a well-orchestrated 
civil society campaign for meaningful external debt relief for highly-
indebted countries, particularly in Mrica, intended to free up scarce 
financial resources to address HIV I AIDS and other critical social de-
velopment needs.33 A key element of HIPC was the requirement that 
HIPC countries prepare comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) to ensure that the resources freed up through debt 
30 !d. para. 52. 
31 !d. para. 56. 
32 See generally International Monetary Fund (IMF), Debt Relief Under the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, at http:/ /www.imf.org/ external/np/hipc/hipc. 
htm (Apr. 2004). 
33 See generally Jubilee Research, About Us, at http:/ /www.jubilee2000uk.org/about/ 
about.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). The Jubilee 2000 campaign produced a global peti-
tion with twenty-four million signatures. !d. 
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relief would be used effectively for poverty reduction.34 The World 
Bank's recommitment to poverty reduction also coincided with in-
creased attention to the social impacts of World Bank-financed struc-
tural adjustment programs (and macroeconomic stabilization pro-
grams financed by the IMF) and greater effort to mitigate negative 
impacts of these programs on vulnerable groups through the protec-
tion of social expenditures and the establishment of social funds.35 
This shift in adjustment lending also responded to widespread criti-
cism of the IMF's and World Bank's stabilization and adjustment pro-
grams from member countries, other international agencies, and civil 
society in both industrialized and developing countries.36 
D. Criticisms of World Bank/IMF Appmaches to Trade 
Among other concerns, external critics of structural adjustment 
lending have focused on trade liberalization measures included in many 
of the World Bank's adjustment loans. For example, the Structural Ad-
justment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), a 
global network of civil society groups and researchers, recently com-
pleted a four-year, multi-conn try study of the effects of specific structural 
adjustment policies on a range of economic sectors and social groups.37 
The study was funded by the European Union and several European 
governments, the UNDP, and others, and it involved collaboration with 
World Bank staff and government officials, as well as a wide range of 
non-government stakeholders in each country. Some key conclusions of 
the study related to trade liberalization were: 
• Trade liberalization, having been pushed through indis-
criminately, has allowed import growth to surpass that of 
54 See genemlly World Bank, Overview of Poverty Reduction Strategies, at http://www. 
worldbank.org/ poverty I strategies/ overview.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
55 See WoRLD BANK, ADJUSTMENT LENDING RETROSPECTIVE, at xi-xii (2001), http:/ I 
siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/alretro.pdf. 
!16 See id. at X. See generally CoMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, ENGENDERING ADJUSTMENT 
FOR THE 1990s: REPORT OF A COMMONWEALTH EXPERT GROUP ON WoMEN AND STRUC-
TURAL ADJUSTMENT (1989); GITA SEN & CAREN GROWN, DEVELOPMENT, CRISES, AND AL-
TERNATIVE VISIONS: ThiRD WORLD WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES (1987); UNITED NATIONS 
CHILDREN'S FUND, ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND 
PRoMOTING GROWTH (Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al. eds., vol. I 1987). 
!7 See generally STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INTERNATIONAL NET-
WORK (SAPRIN), THE POLICY RooTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND PoVERTY: A MuLTI-
COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY AssESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT (2002), http://www. 
saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf. 
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exports and destroyed the conditions necessary for the sus-
tainable growth of domestic firms[;] 
• Exchange-rate depreciation, unable to contribute effec-
tively to the export competitiveness of domestic industries 
... , has increased the price of imported inputs and raised 
production costs, which particularly hurt manufacturing 
firms producing for the domestic market[;] 
• Export growth has been concentrated in a few activities 
that do not create links to the local economy and has typi-
cally been very narrowly based on a few resources and items 
produced with low-skilled labor[;] 
• The limited employment that has been generated is highly 
concentrated in export enclaves or in similarly low-wage 
services .... Overall, real wage rates have tended to decline, 
income inequality has increased, and job insecurity and "in-
formalization" have become more pervasive.38 
Based on these findings, the SAPRIN review recommended that 
[t]rade-reform measures should take into account the condi-
tions of domestic producers and should be paced and se-
quenced in order to create a level playing field that will help 
to stimulate local production and ensure that domestic en-
terprises can face competition from foreign goods .... Trade 
reform should be nuanced rather than indiscriminate [and] 
future reform processes should be designed by governments 
with the participation of a wide range of sectors and popula-
tion groups to ensure that policies are consistent with na-
tional development aspirations.39 
Another recent critique of development bank approaches to trade 
policy, which focused on the particular challenges facing LDCs, came 
from UNCTAD in its Least Developed Countries Report 2002. In this 
case, the critique also extended to the World Bank's (and IMF's) cur-
38 I d. at 55-56. 
39 Id. at 56. In its own review of the SAPRIN country studies on trade liberalization, the 
World Bank concluded that "[m]any of the concerns presented in the ... reports are not 
supported by the country-specific data or are contrary to international experience. That does 
not, however, imply that there is no room for improvement in reform programs proposed by 
the international financial institutions," WORLD BANK, AnjUS'IMENT FROM WITHIN: LESSONS 
FROM THE STRUCTURAL AnjUS'IMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INITIATIVE 33 (2001), http:/ j 
www.worldbank.org/ research/ sapri/WB _SAPRI_Report. pdf. 
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rent approach to poverty reduction through PRSPs. In summary, the 
UNCTAD report argued that: 
• LDCs suffer from generalized poverty, which constrains eco-
nomic growth through its dampening effects on domestic re-
sources available for private investment and public goods, and 
negative environmental effects; 
• International economic relations could play a key role in helping 
LDCs break the cycle of generalized poverty and economic stag-
nation (for example, through exports, access to modern tech-
nologies, and opportunities for migration); 
• However, in LDCs dependent on primary commodity exports, the 
combination of falling and volatile commodity prices, unsustain-
able external debt, and a donor-driven aid and debt service system 
is reinforcing the cycle of generalized poverty and economic stag-
nation. Even LDCs that have attempted to diversify out of com-
modities into low-skill manufacturing are increasingly competing 
against each other and encountering falling terms oftrade.40 
UNCTAD's main criticism of the World Bank/IMF approach to 
PRSPs for LDCs was that the poverty reduction strategies prepared 
thus far have tended to be oriented toward adjustment rather than 
development. From this perspective, pro-poor public expenditure 
management techniques have essentially been grafted onto macro-
economic policies and structural reform programs that are substan-
tially similar to the policies the World Bank has promoted since the 
1980s through structural adjustment loans. UNCTAD found that 
these policies generally had not reduced the incidence of poverty in 
LDCs and concluded that structural adjustment policies are not the 
appropriate tools for achieving pro-poor growth. Instead, UNCTAD 
recommended that LDC governments be given leeway to devise more 
"development-oriented" strategies that focus on improving supply ca-
pabilities and productive capacities, establishing a dynamic invest-
ment-export nexus, and preventing marginalization of particular 
groups and regions through a variety ofpolicies.41 
40 See UNCTAD, ThE LEAST DEVELOPED CouNTRIES REPORT 2002: EscAPING THE POV-
ERTY TRAP, at iv-ix (2002). 
41 See id. at 199. Possible "anti-marginalization" policies include agrarian reform and 
rural development; support for small, medium, and micro-enterprises; promotion of 
backward linkages from export activity; and broad-based investments in education and 
health. UNCTAD suggested that the selection of appropriate policies be based on a struc-
tural approach to poverty analysis, which would consider among other things how gender 
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Although the SAPRIN review and UNCTAD report used different 
methodologies and focused on different sets of developing countries, 
they both highlighted the need for external advisors to take into ac-
count a country's particular constraints and other characteristics in 
recommending trade policies to promote economic growth and re-
duce poverty. This has also been the strong recommendation of 
economists, such as Dani Rodrik, who have stressed the limits of trade 
policy; the variety of strategies that successful economies have used to 
open themselves to trade over time; and the need to develop resilient 
domestic institutions to withstand the external shocks that come with 
trade openness.42 A recent study on trade and sustainable human de-
velopment, supported by UNDP and other organizations, and a re-
cent publication by Oxfam International on trade and poverty, echo 
many of the same themes.43 
II. DEVELOPMENT CoMMUNITY RESPONSES To DoHA 
The outcome documents from the Doha Ministerial Conference 
suggested three related channels through which development banks 
and agencies could support the DDA under the general framework of 
promoting "coherence in global economic policy-making. "44 First, the 
Ministerial Declaration confirmed that "technical cooperation and ca-
pacity building are core elements of the development dimension of the 
multilateral trading system" and called for "effective coordinated deliv-
ery of technical assistance" to developing countries, including relevant 
international and regional institutions, the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee, and bilateral donors.45 This could include enhanced 
use of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assis-
tance to Least-Developed Countries (Integrated Framework), which 
relations influence economic activity through factor and product markets, the productivity 
of inputs and economic behavior of agents, and the growth and distribution of income. See 
id. at 191. 
42 See generally RODRIK, supra note 5; DANI RODRIK, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL GoVERNANCE OF TRADE: As IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED 
(2001) [hereinafter GLOBAL GovERNANCE OF TRADE]; Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism, 
What? (2002), http:/ /www.new-rules.org/Docs/ Afterneolib/Rodrik.pdf (paper presented 
at the Alternatives to Neoliberalism Conference, sponsored by the New Rules for Global 
Finance Coalition). 
43 See generally KAMAL MALHOTRA ET AL., MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE 
(2003); 0XFAM INTERNATIONAL, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBAL-
ISATION, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY (2002), http:/ /www.maketradefair.org/assets/ 
english/Report_English.pdf. 
44 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 5. 
45 Id. paras. 38-39. 
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was established in 1997 and has involved the IMF, International Trade 
Center, UNDP, UNCTAD, World Bank, and WTQ.46 Second, within the 
provisions on improved technical cooperation and capacity building, 
the Doha Declaration endorsed efforts to "mainstream[] trade in na-
tional plans for economic development and strategies for poverty re-
duction. "47 This clearly implicates the World Bank in its work with de-
veloping countries on PRSPs but is also relevant to all development 
banks and agencies in terms of their general support to developing 
countries' national development plans. Third, the Doha Declaration 
supported initiatives by WTO members and international organizations 
to assess the impact of trade policies, for example, from an environ-
mental perspective or as provided in the guidelines for further negotia-
tions under the General Agreement on Trade in Services.4B 
A. Policy Coherence: General Trends and Issues 
The concept of policy coherence has generated considerable in-
terest at the international level in recent years. The OECD coined the 
term "policy coherence for development" in the early 1990s and has 
defined it as "the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy 
actions" aimed at "taking account of the needs and interests of develop-
ing countries in the evolution of the global economy. "49 Policy coher-
ence was a fundamental concern of trade negotiators during the Uru-
guay Round and prompted the drafting of a specific ministerial 
declaration to promote "greater coherence in global economic policy-
making." The declaration noted the importance of achieving harmony 
between "structural, macroeconomic, trade, financial and development 
46 See generally WfO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for the Least-
Developed Countries' Trade Development, An Integrated Framew01* for Trade-Related Techni-
cal Assistance, Including for Human and Institutional Capacity-Building, to Support Least-
Developed Countries in Their Trade and Tmde-Related Activities-Revision, WT/LDC/HL/1/ 
Rev.1 (Oct. 23, 1997), http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/framework.htm. 
47 MinisterialDeclamtion, supm note 4, para. 38. 
48 See id. paras. 6, 15. 
49 ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Poucv CoHER-
ENcE: VITAL FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (2003), http:/ /www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ll/35/ 
20202515.pdf. Similarly, the U.N. Secretary General has defined "coherence" as "consis-
tent and sustainable outcomes-based on mutually supportive policies and actions by all 
actors and institutions." U.N. ESCOR, Increased Coherence, Coordination and Cooperation joT the 
Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment at All Levels One Year After the Conference: Note by the SecTetary Genera~ para. 7, U.N. 
Doc. E/2003/50 (2003) (prepared for the special high-level meeting of the Economic and 
Social Council with the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WfO, Apr. 14, 2003), 
http:/ /www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd0403hilevelBWI.htm. 
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aspects of economic policymaking," at both national and international 
levels, and specifically authorized the Director-General of the WTO to 
pursue cooperation with the heads of the IMF and World Bank. 5° At the 
recent International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey, the concept was extended to encompass "coherence and 
consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading sys-
tems in support of development" and specifically to support the 
MDGs.51 Policy coherence is also the general theme of the eleventh 
UNCTAD session that will be held in June 2004 in Sao Paolo. The focus 
of UNCTAD XI is on "enhancing coherence between national devel-
50 \VTO Secretariat, Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation Between the 
WTO, the !Jv!F and the World Bank, Wf /TF /COH/S/7, at 21-22 (Apr. 29, 2003) (including 
the 1994 WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organiza-
tion to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking). According to the 
WTO Secretariat, trade negotiators in the Uruguay Round were particularly concerned 
about the following: 
volatile exchange rates [that] were perceived to be raising the costs and un-
certainties of trade and discouraging governments from abandoning quanti-
tative trade restrictions and lowering tariffs; large and persistent current ac-
count imbalances that were generating protectionist pressures; low and 
volatile commodity prices; and debt problems of developing countries, par-
ticularly in Latin America. 
!d. Annex 1, para. 3 (citation omitted). In the latter case, the concern was that "[i]ndebted 
developing countries were struggling to meet their financial obligations at the same time that 
market access barriers in their main trading partners (and main creditors) were impeding 
their ability to earn foreign exchange." !d. Following the directive in the Ministerial Declara-
tion, the \VTO signed formal cooperation agreements with the IMF and World Bank in 1996, 
which provide for "closer cooperation ... through staff participation in relevant official 
meetings, exchange of data, reports and documents, and regular staff contacts." !d. para. 12. 
This cooperation has also included high-level contacts. For example, in May 2003, the heads 
of the IMF and World Bank participated in a WTO General Council meeting on policy co-
herence. Press Release, \VTO, No. 341, Coherence: Joint Statement (May 13, 2003), 
http:/ /www.wto.org/englil.h/news_e/pres03_e/pr341_e.htrn. The WTO has also sought 
greater cooperation with the regional development banks. See, e.g., Press Release, WTO, No. 
292r1, Director-General Mike Moore Convenes First Informal Dialogue with Heads of Re-
gional Development Banks on the Implementation of the Doha Development Agenda (May 
3, 2002), http:/ /www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr292_e.htrn. 
51 MoNTERREY CoNSENSUs, supra note 27, at 12. The Monterrey Consensus encouraged 
the U.N., IMF, World Bank, and WTO to continue to address coherence and coordination 
issues, through periodic high-level meetings, and provided for high-level dialogue on 
"strengthening international cooperation for development" at the ministerial level every two 
years. !d. para. 69. In 2003, for example, there was a special high-level meeting of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council with the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in April, followed by a high-
level dialogue on financing for development in the U.N. General Assembly in October. Both 
meetings included consultations with representatives of civil society and other stakeholders. 
Materials from both meetings are available at http:/ /www.un.org/ esa/ffd. 
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opment strategies and global economic processes towards economic 
growth and development, particularly of developing countries."52 
The OECD points out that "[c]oherence has always been ... a 
function of competing and conflicting interests and values" in which 
"stakeholder power and political will" play important parts.53 The like-
lihood of achieving coherence between different policies can turn on 
several factors, including the similarity of the policies; the range of 
interests and stakeholders involved; the level(s) of governance that 
are engaged (which could include international, regional, national, 
and community actors); and the types of cooperation or other action 
involved (which might range from information-sharing and consulta-
tions to joint research and co-funding of specific projects). There is a 
general concern-for example, among development agencies-that 
efforts to improve policy coherence might result in a homogeneity of 
approaches.54 Another general concern is that seemingly coherent 
policies may mask very inconsistent approaches in their implementa-
tion. 
In the area of trade and development policies, the coherence is-
sues are wide-ranging. For example, some of the substantive concerns 
about WTO rules from a development perspective relate to the im-
pact of industrialized countries' agricultural subsidies on farmers in 
developing countries; the impact of high import tariffs on garments 
and other products made in developing countries; the tension be-
tween the protection of intellectual property and the sharing of tech-
nology with developing countries; and the impact of tariff reductions 
on national budgets, particularly on social expenditures such as pub-
lic health and education. Other aspects of the international economic 
system that have also prompted concern include the impact of volatile 
exchange rates and world commodity prices on developing countries, 
especially LDCs; the links between high levels of external debt and 
promotion of exports; the links between trade liberalization and de-
52 UNCTAD, A.pproval of the Provisional A.genda for the Conference, U.N. Trade and Devel-
opment Board, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. TD/B/50/L.l (2003). 
53 ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 49, at 3. 
54 However, the international development community has recognized the burden on 
developing countries of complying with different donor procedures, for example those re-
lated to procuring goods and services and monitoring and reporting on projects. Under the 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization, issued in February 2003, international and bilateral 
development agencies committed to harmonize their procedures in several areas. See generally 
ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-oPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DAC GuiDELINEs: HAR-
MONISING DONOR PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE Am DELIVERY (2003), http:/ /www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/0/ 48/20896122.pdf. 
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velopment finance, reflected in trade-related conditions in IMF and 
development bank loans; and the limited participation of developing 
country governments and their constituencies in international eco-
nomic decision-making. 55 
The international focus on policy coherence has also attracted 
criticism. Douglas Hellinger, coordinator of the SAPRIN study, has dis-
missed the notion of "coherence in international monetary, financial 
and trading systems to support development" as "an oxymoron. "56 He 
argues instead for "a new coherence, a convergence around a different 
set of values and principles-namely respect for diversity, equity, self-
reliance, self-determination, community and environmental 
sustainability, democratic economic decisionmaking, transparency and 
accountability."57 The economist Joseph Stiglitz and others have also 
criticized the dominance of the international economic system by the 
IMF, World Bank, and WfO and have proposed that the U.N. should 
play a greater role in international financial issues through a new "eco-
nomic and social security council. "58 Several civil society actors have 
voiced similar concerns about the role of the IMF as the "gatekeeper" 
for financial assistance to developing countries and the dominance of 
the World Bank in country-level development processes such as the 
formulation of PRSPs, diagnostic trade studies, and trade-related tech-
nical assistance. 59 
55 See generally U.N. ESCOR, supra note 49; Civil Society Statement on Policy Coherence, 
http:/ /www.coc.org/pdfs/coc/ecosoc3.pdf (Apr. 14, 2003) (presented at the special high-
level meeting of the Economic and Social Council with the Bretton Woods Institutions and 
theWfO). 
56 Douglas Hellinger, Statement at the United Nations Civil Society Hearings on Fi-
nancing for Development 2 (Nov. 7, 2000), http:/ /www.developmentgap.org/dh_un_state-
ment.htm. 
57 Jd. 
58 Press Release, United Nations, World Needs United Nations Economic and Social 
Security Council, Says Nobel Laureate in Keynote Address to Second Committee (Oct. 15, 
2003). 
59 See generally BRETTON WoODS PROJECT, AT ISSUE: HARMONISATION AND COHERENCE: 
WHITE KNIGHTS OR TROJAN HORSES? (2003), http:/ /www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/ 
knowledgebank/coherence.pdf; ALDo CALlARI, CENTER OF CoNCERN, CoHERENCE BE-
TWEEN TRADE AND FINANCIAL POLICIES: SUMMARY OF CURRENT ISSUES AND POSSIBLE RE-
SEARCH AND ADvocACY AGENDA (2002), http:/ /www.coc.org/pdfs/coc/coherence_trade 
902.pdf; LISA jORDAN, BANK INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH OF DEVELOPMENT? THE 
CONVERGING POLICY AGENDAS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION (1999), http:/ /www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/misc_resources/458.php;jEFF PowELL, 
BRETTON WooDS PROJECT, CORNERING THE MARKET: THE WoRLD BANK AND TRADE CA-
PACITY BuiLDING (2002), http:/ /www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/ 
cornering/ corneringthemarket.pdf. 
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The international debate on policy coherence has strong paral-
lels with the academic discourse on "linkages" between international 
trade law and other international law areas such as the environment, 
labor, and human rights.6° For example, many of the concerns about 
the dominance of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in the interna-
tional economic system (relative to the U.N. and its agencies) reso-
nate with concerns expressed about the power of international trade 
rules that are enforceable through trade sanctions (compared with 
the weak enforcement mechanisms in international labor standards 
and human rights treaties). Just as the IMF has been criticized for 
misdiagnosing recent financial crises and prescribing policy measures 
that actually exacerbated the crises,61 international trade law has been 
roundly criticized for relying on outdated assumptions about the 
global economy and for even violating basic principles of trade eco-
nomics (for example, in the area of subsidies) .62 
The next section examines the coherence of trade and develop-
ment policies within one institution, the World Bank. 
B. Policy Coherence in the World Bank 
1. Trade and Development Policy Framework 
The goal of policy coherence, even within the same organization, 
is far easier to articulate than to implement. This is especially true for 
a large organization such as the World Bank, which has an extremely 
broad agenda, including multiple policy goals that reflect different 
analytical and ideological perspectives. Trade liberalization and pov-
erty reduction are clear examples of the "policy tension" that can re-
sult. This tension can operate on several levels. vVhereas trade liber-
alization is part of the neoliberal economic policy framework 
60 See e.g., Sara Dillon, A Farewell to "Linkage": International Trade Law and Global 
Sustainability Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 87 (2002) (critiquing the "linkage" literature); 
see also Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L 
EcoN. L. 201 (1998); Symposium, The Boundaries of the VITO, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (2002). 
61 See, e.g.,josEPH £.STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITs DISCONTENTS 15 (2002). 
62 GLOBAL GoVERNANCE OF ThADE, supra note 42, at 27 (treatment of subsidies under 
WfO rules is "utterly devoid of any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of 
a narrow set of powerful groups in the advanced industrial countries"); Michael H. Davis & 
Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and 
Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 UMKC L. REv., 733, 751-62, 767-70 
(2001); Dillon, supra note 60, at 111-12. 
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commonly referred to as the 'Washington Consensus, "63 which the 
IMF and MDBs have pursued since the 1980s, current approaches to 
poverty reduction-which emphasize its multidimensionality, includ-
ing elements of vulnerability and disempowerment-have their roots 
in alternative development discourses, such as UNDP's "human de-
velopment" framework,64 Amartya Sen's "capabilities" approach,65 and 
the participatory methods of Robert Chambers66 and others.67 The 
two policy goals are also associated with very different methodologies 
for research and analysis: while trade effects are typically analyzed 
through economic models using macroeconomic data, poverty analy-
sis relies increasingly on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
measures (including participatory assessments) carried out at the 
community, household, and individual levels.68 In terms of policy de-
velopment, there are also "cultural" differences: while "trade culture" 
is commonly viewed as "legalistic and highly centralised," "develop-
ment culture" aspires to be "decentralised, demand driven, and based 
on a country-owned process."69 Moreover, even among macroeconom-
ists, there are ongoing debates about the relationships among trade 
63 See John Williamson, Democracy and the "Washington Consensus," 21 WoRLD DEv. 1329, 
1333 (1993). Interestingly, however, Williamson himself "explicitly recognized the exis-
tence of a significant difference of opinion [even] in Washington, and ... in the [econom-
ics] profession at large," and therefore put trade liberalization in the category of economic 
policies "where controversy still reigns" rather than "where consensus has been estab-
lished." ld. at 1331, 1333. 
64 See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT REPORT 2003, at 27-29 (2003). 
65 Seegeneral/yAMAKfYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000). 
66 See generally RoBERT CHAMBERS, WHOSE REALITY COUNTS? PUTTING THE FIRST LAST 
(1997). 
67 It should be noted, however, that the World Bank's approach to poverty reduction, 
reflected in the World Development Report 2000, places significantly more weight on eco-
nomic growth than most alternative development approaches. Another observation is that 
the World Bank's policy recommendations for achieving "pro-poor growth" do not differ 
substantially from the adjustment and liberalization policies it has been promoting since 
the 1980s. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 40, at x-xi; ALEx WILKS & FABIEN LEFRANQOIS, 
BREl:TON WoODS PROJECT & WoRLD VISION, BLINDING WITH SCIENCE OR ENCOURAGING 
DEBATE? How 'WoRLD BANK ANALYSIS DETERMINES PRSP PoLICIES 22-25 (2002), http:/ I 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/blinding/blindful.pdf. 
68 See jEFFREY j. REIMER, ESTIMATING THE PoVERTY IMPACTS OF ThADE LIBERALIZATION 
1-3 (2002), http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/files/12035_wps2790.pdf. 
69 See, e.g., WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report on the Seminar by 
the Integrated Framework Core ,'lgencies: The Policy Relevance of Mainstreaming Trade into Country 
Development Strategies-Perspectives of Least-Developed Countries, WT I LDC/ SWG /IF I 15 /Rev.1, 
at 17 (Apr. 17, 2001). 
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openness, economic growth, and poverty reduction that have 
significant implications for development policy.7o 
Having adopted poverty reduction as its overall mission, the 
World Bank has moved poverty reduction to the top of its policy hier-
archy. Therefore, one would expect poverty concerns to temper and 
shape the World Bank's current approach to trade. The principles of 
the PRSP process provide one possible pro-poor framework for trade 
policy advice and support to developing countries.71 These principles 
7° For example, the World Bank's support for the new "development round" of trade 
negotiations launched in Doha was based in large part on cross-country studies claiming to 
demonstrate that liberal trade policies cause growth and thereby benefit the poor. See gen-
erally DAVID DoLLAR & AART KRAAY, WoRLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION Is GooD FOR THE PooR 
(2001), http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/files/1696_wps2587.pdf; DAviD DoLLAR & AART 
KRAAY, WoRLD BANK, TRADE, GRoWTH AND PovERTY (2001), http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/ 
files/2207 _wps2615.pdf; Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of 
Global Integration, 1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcTIVITIES 1. However, the conclu-
sions of these studies have been challenged by other economists. See generally RAvi KANBUR, 
GROWTH AND ThADE: THE LAST REDOUBT? (2001), http:/ /peopJe.cornell.edu/pages/ 
sk145/papers.htm; BRANKO MILANOVIC, THE Two FACES OF GLOBALIZATION: AGAINST 
GLOBALIZATION AS WE KNow IT (draft May 2002), http:/ /econpapers.hhs.se/paper/ 
wpawuwpdc/0303007.htm; DANI RoDRIK, CoMMENTS ON "TRADE GROWTH AND PovERTY" 
BY D. DOLLAR AND A. KRAAY (2000), http:/ /www.gapresearch.org/eldis/; MARK WEISBROT 
& DEAN BAKER, THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF ThADE LIBERALIZATION ON DEVELOPING CoUN-
TRIES (2002), http:/ /www.cepr.net/pages/GJobaJization_page.htm; MARK WEISBROT ET 
AL., GROWTH MAY BE GooD FOR THE PooR: BuT ARE IMF AND WoRLD BANK PoLICIES 
GooD FOR GRowTH? (2001), http:/ /www.cepr.net/pages/Giobalization_page.htm; Paul 
Mosley, Globalisation, Economic Policy and Convergence, 23 WoRLD EcoN. 613 (2000); Fran-
cisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the 
Cross-National Evidence, in MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 261 (Ben S. Bernake & Kenneth Rog-
off eds., 2000). Dani Rodrik, in particular, has argued that the successes of "new globaliz-
ers," such as the East Asian countries, China, and India, are attributable mainly to country-
specific strategies for domestic investment and institution-building and that they opened 
their economies to imports and foreign investment only gradually after they had achieved 
a certain level of economic growth. GLOBAL GovERNANCE OF TRADE, supra note 42, at 22-
25. 
7! The core principles underlying poverty reduction strategies are that they be: "country 
driven-involving broad-based participation by civil society and the prh-ate sector ... ; results-
oriente~focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor; comprehensive in recognizing the 
multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership-oriented ... ; and based on a long-term perspec-
tive for poverty reduction." WoRLD BANK, supra note 34, at 1-2 (emphasis added). It is impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that the World Bank's poverty reduction mandate has its own 
contested history. During the drafting of the World Development Report 2000, internal debates 
about the relative importance of economic growth for poverty reduction led to the resigna-
tion of the report's chief author, economist Ravi Kanbur. See generally Ravi Kanbur, Economic 
Policy, Dishibution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements, 29 WoRLD DEv. 1083 (2001); Robert 
Hunter Wade, Making the Wmid Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty, 29 WoRLD DEv. 
1435 (2001). The control of the PRSP process by international financial institutions-princi-
pally the IMF and World Bank-has also been critiqued by academic commentators, civil 
society groups, and other international organizations. See generally MARTA ARIAs ET AL., Ox-
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suggest that any trade policy recommendations to a developing coun-
try should be tailored to the country's specific context and should 
directly support its poverty reduction strategy and commitments to-
ward the MDGs. Further, the recommendations should be based on 
an analysis of various trade policy options and an assessment of the 
likely impacts-positive and negative-of these options on poor peo-
ple and other vulnerable groups. Trade policy options should also be 
evaluated in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, includ-
ing non-trade ministries and representatives of civil society and pri-
vate sector groups. Finally, any trade policy recommendation should 
allow flexibility to adjust the policy to address any negative impacts 
that might arise in implementation. 
Recent World Bank publications and other documents suggest that 
there is a framework in place to link trade policy to poverty reduction. 
In general, however, trade liberalization is still seen as a development 
goal that is parallel rather than subordinate to poverty reduction. This 
reflects the general belief of World Bank economists that trade liberali-
zation spurs economic growth, and therefore-indirectly, at least-in-
creased trade should support poverty reduction. The World Bank's ap-
proach to trade policy advice does not adhere consistently to general 
PRSP principles, although some work is starting to be done to at least 
analyze the distributional effect of some trade reforms. 
The Global Poverty Report 2001, which was prepared by the IMF, 
World Bank, and four regional development banks for the G8 Summit 
in July 2001, set out an analytical framework to guide the IMF's and 
MDBs' work related to trade and poverty.72 The report traced several 
channels through which increased trade openness could affect an 
economy, particularly including its poor people. These channels in-
clude: ( 1) effects on the prices of goods and services that the poor con-
FAM INTERNATIONAL, FRoM 'DoNORSHIP' TO OwNERSHIP? MoVING TowARDS PRSP RoUND 
Two, 1-3, 8-9, 16-19, 21-23 (2004), http:/ /www.oxfam.org.uk; UNCTAD, supra note 40, at 
x-xi; David Craig & Doug Porter, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence, 31 
WORLD DEY. 53 (2002); WILKS & LEFRANI;OIS, supra note 67, at 32-35; cj. jiM LEVINSOHN, 
THE WoRLD BANK's POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER APPROACH: GooD MARKETING OR 
Goon PoLICY? 9-13 (UNCTAD & Harvard Univ. Center for lnt'l Dev., G-24 Discussion Paper 
Series No. 21, 2003) (author finds PRSP process an improvement over past practice in which 
IMF and World Bank teams would draft all economic plans for countries). 
72 See generally AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ET AL., A GLOBALIZED MARKET-OPPOR-
TUNITIES AND RISKS FOR THE PooR (2001), http:/ /www.worldbank.org/poverty/Jibrary/ 
G8_2001.pdf. "GS" refers to the Group of Eight, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See International Monetary 
Fund, A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, at http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/ 
exr/facts/groups.htm (Dec. 2003). 
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sume and produce; (2) effects on the demand for and returns to fac-
tors of production that the poor can offer, such as labor; (3) effects on 
government revenue and resources available for anti-poverty programs; 
(4) the potential for economic growth; and (5) transition costs, includ-
ing the possibility of increased volatility of growth, resulting in the need 
for social protection mechanisms. The report concluded that "compre-
hensive trade reform can help reduce poverty when it is part of a set of 
reforms that improve the domestic macroeconomic and investment 
climate, enhance infrastructure and technology, and contribute to the 
provision of knowledge and skills. "73 However, the report cautioned 
that "these effects vary significantly across countries, regions, and 
groups within countries, which makes it difficult to generalize about 
the effects of trade liberalization on poverty. "74 
In terms of recommendations, the Global Poverty Report 2001 
called on developed countries to remove protective barriers on im-
ports of agricultural and manufactured goods, reduce subsidies, and 
increase market access for goods from developing countries. The re-
port encouraged developing countries to integrate trade reform in 
their broader development agendas, together with taking measures to 
increase the asset base of poor people (including education, health, 
and land), to make markets work better for poor people, and to re-
duce social barriers that disadvantage women and certain ethnic or 
racial groups. The report also called for "a careful sequence and mix 
of reductions of border barriers and domestic reforms so as to maxi-
mize the growth potential from trade liberalization while minimizing 
its adverse impact on poverty. "75 
The Global Poverty Report 2001 did not address all of the criticisms 
of past World Bank support for trade liberalization-for example, 
UNCTAD's concern about the structural problems of commodity-
exporting LDCs-but it nevertheless provided a basic framework for 
examining the possible impacts of trade policy changes on poor peo-
ple. However, subsequent World Bank research reports have been 
much more upbeat about the benefits of increased trade for develop-
ing countries, although they have criticized some trade agreements 
and practices and have shown increasing concern about the imple-
mentation costs of trade agreements for developing countries. 
73 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ET AL., supra note 72, at 1. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2. 
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In Global Economic Prospects 2004, for example, the World Bank's 
research economists marshaled statistics and arguments in support of 
a "pro-poor Doha outcome," including further reductions in tariffs 
and agricultural subsidies and further liberalization of services (in-
cluding labor services). The report provides compelling statistics on 
the magnitude and negative development impact of agricultural sub-
sidies in industrialized countries, as well as statistics on the generally 
higher tariffs these countries impose on imports from developing 
countries (compared with imports from other industrialized coun-
tries). In addition, the report acknowledges the industrialized-country 
bias in WTO agreements and considers the po~sibility of renegotiating 
some of the agreements-for example, the Agreement on Agriculture 
and the TRIPS Agreement-to address the resource and capacity con-
straints of developing countries. The report also suggests that "more 
attention and resources should be devoted to costing out the imple-
mentation requirements of proposed rules and to calculating their 
costs and benefits. "76 The last recommendation echoes earlier 
findings by World Bank economists on the substantial implementa-
tion costs of some Uruguay Round agreements.77 The report there-
fore questions the wisdom of introducing new uniform trade rules on 
"behind-the-border" issues that would require substantial changes in 
domestic regulatory schemes. In the area of tariff reform, however, 
the report argues that both "[d]eveloped and developing countries 
alike could affirm their commitment to poverty reduction by accept-
ing an ambitious program of liberalization. "78 
76 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EcONOMIC PROSPECTS: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE 
OF THE DoHA AGENDA 225 (2003), available at http:/ /www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep 
2004/full.pdf. 
77 A study by economists J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler, which estimated that it 
cost developing countries on average US$150 million to implement only three of the Uru-
guay Round agreements, has been widely cited outside the World Bank by researchers and 
activists. Finger & Schuler, supra note 5, at 525; see also J. MICHAEL FINGER & JuLio J. 
NoGuts, THE UNBALANCED URUGUAY RouND OuTCOME: THE NEw AREAS IN FuTURE WTO 
NEGOTIATIONS 6-11 (2001), http:/ /www-wds.worldbank.org/ servlet/WDSCon ten tServer I 
WDSP /IB/2002/01/ 18/000094946_0201 0904095672/Rendered/PDF I multiOpage.pdf. 
78 WoRLD BANK, supra note 76, at 219. The report also includes an extensive critique of 
the "special and differential treatment" provisions in WTO and other trade agreements and 
outlines options for a narrower approach, which would apply mainly to the implementation 
of new trade rules on "behind-the-border" issues and would benefit a smaller group of devel-
oping countries, such as LDCs. ld. at 222-24. This narrower concept of "special and differen-
tial treatment" has been sharply criticized by some civil society groups. See, e.g., CLAIRE 
MELAMED, CHRISTIAN AID, WORLD BANK ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 'TREATMENT: BAD 
EcoNOMIC~, WoRsE PoLITICS (2003), http:/ /www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml? 
cmd[126] ~x-126-16286. 
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Other recent World Bank publications promote a similarly opti-
mistic view of the benefits of trade liberalization for developing coun-
tries, in which adjustment costs are relatively small and short-term and 
can be addressed through compensatory programs carried out under 
the country's poverty reduction or general development strategies. This 
optimism flows through the trade chapter of the World Bank's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Sourcebook,79 which one commentator character-
izes as reflecting "a one-size-fits-all mentality" that is "based more on 
faith than evidence. "80 The optimism is also reflected in the handbook 
that the World Bank recently published to help developing countries 
participate in the trade negotiations under the DDA.8I Notably, only 
one of the fifty-five chapters directly addresses the relation between 
trade policies and poverty reduction. The implication is that, rather 
than being one of several policy tools that developing country govern-
ments may use to reduce poverty, trade liberalization is a goal to be 
pursued in any case, and any social costs associated with it can simply be 
mitigated through supplemental, "poverty-reduction" schemes (instead 
of providing a basis for reexamining the trade policy itself). 
The World Bank's pro-trade agenda is most evident in the 2003 
Progress Report of its newly established Trade Department. While this 
report mentions the need for "greater attention towards the distribu-
tional impact of trade and trade reforms," the main thrust of the 
agenda outlined in the report is to ( 1) support the Doha process, (2) 
support regional integration initiatives, and (3) "promote trade inte-
gration as a core element of country development strategies. "82 The 
implications of this agenda for the PRSP process and other country-
level activities are considered in the following subsections. 
79 See generally BERNARD HoEKMAN ET AL., WoRLD BANK, TRADE PoLicY REFORM AND 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION (2001), http:/ /econ.worldbank.org/files/3175_wps2733.pdf. 
This chapter from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook emphasizes the cost of 
trade barriers to the poor and highlights successful cases of trade reform. According to the 
Sourcebook, the weight of evidence-mostly from industrialized country experience-
suggests that adjustment costs should be low relative to the gains from liberalization, 
although the extreme poor may not be able to absorb even short-term adjustment costs. 
For example, export processing zones are discussed in terms of their positive impact on 
raising female employment in many developing countries, but there is no discussion of 
relative wages of men and women, working conditions, or employment trends. 
80 LEVINSOHN, supra note 71, at 10. 
8! See generally WoRLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK (Ber-
nard Hoekman et al., eds.) (2002). 
82 WoRLD BANK, THE WoRLD BANK's OPERATIONAL TRADE AGENDA: TRADE PRoGREss 
REPORT, at iii (2003). 
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2. Trade Mainstreaming 
Although "mainstreaming" is a familiar concept in development 
practice, "trade mainstreaming" is a relatively new variation. As used 
by the WfO, World Bank, and other core agencies in the Integrated 
Framework, it refers to the integration of trade into country devel-
opment plans and poverty reduction strategies.83 Trade mainstream-
ing was first adopted as an outcome of a review of the Integrated 
Framework, but it now has broader relevance under the DDA.84 In 
principle, trade mainstreaming should further the goal of policy co-
herence by incorporating trade policy in a country's overall develop-
ment framework and ensuring that it complements the country's 
other economic and social priorities. 
There is a risk, however, that trade policy analysis and recommen-
dations could simply be inserted in a national development plan or 
poverty reduction strategy without any effort made to ensure that the 
trade policy furthers the country's poverty reduction goals. This possi-
bility has concerned some international agencies and civil society 
groups who fear that "the Bank's lead role in mainstreaming trade into 
PRSPs ... offers the opportunity to lock the trade liberalization agenda 
into national development plans of the most vulnerable countries."85 
The concern was heightened by the proposal to add "trade integration 
strategy chapters" to PRSPs and to have these chapters be based on "di-
agnostic trade integration studies," such as those that have been under-
83 WORLD ThADE ORGANIZATION, TECHNICAL COOPERATION FOR CAPACITY BUILDING, 
GROWTH AND INTEGRATION: THE NEW WTO STRATEGY 4 (2002), http:/ /www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/devel_e/newstrategy_e.doc; ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 27. 
84 See WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Review of the Integrated 
Framework: Communique from Heads of Six Core Agencies, WT /LDC/SWG/IF /2 (July 12, 2000) 
[hereinafter Communique from Heads of Six Core A.gencies]; see also Ministerial Declaration, supra 
note 4, para. 38. 
85 PowELL, supra note 59, at 3; see also UNCTAD, supra note 40, at 229-30. This con-
cern seems justified when one hears WTO officials explain the "incentives" for trade main-
streaming: 
By including trade policy issues in the PRSP and [United Nations Develop-
ment Assistance Framework]-instruments that influence assistance levels re-
ceived by LDCs-countries may be induced into integrating their economies within 
the world economy. For example, the World Bank's level of country assistance 
would be based on the development strategies defined in the PRSP. Increased 
efforts by the LDCs to integrate into the world economy would be rewarded 
by access to a higher level of assistance. 
WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, supra note 69, at 139 (emphasis 
added). 
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taken on a pilot basis under the Integrated Framework.86 The primary 
purpose of these studies is to identifY opportunities for trade liberaliza-
tion and export promotion, not to identifY opportunities to reduce 
poverty through trade policy. The studies are technical exercises car-
ried out by consultant teams rather than as part of the consultative pro-
cesses carried out for the rest of the PRSPs. Therefore, they are not ap-
propriate in their current form simply to "fold into" the PRSPs. What is 
needed is for the key PRSP principles-including country specificity 
and ownership, comprehensiveness, and broad stakeholder participa-
tion-and a thorough poverty impact analysis to be "mainstreamed" 
into the development of any new trade policy. 
The World Bank's Trade Progress Report acknowledges that rela-
tively little attention has been paid to trade issues in PRSPs to date but 
predicts that upcoming PRSPs will include more discussion of trade 
issues as part of "an increasing focus on growth. "87 However, the re-
port also notes that "mainstreaming trade into PRSPs ... of the coun-
tries that are now not actively interested in trade is likely to take time. 
Furthermore, the trade agenda has to compete for policy makers' at-
tention with other immediate concerns" such as HN I AIDS, excessive 
debt, and fiscal crises.88 This raises serious questions about country 
ownership of the trade agenda, as well as the general PRSP process, if 
World Bank teams are pressing developing country governments to 
address trade issues in their PRSPs, even though the countries them-
selves have other, more urgent development priorities. Notably, recent 
World Bank documents now refer to the "embedding" of trade poli-
cies in PRSPs and national development strategies.89 This terminology 
further reinforces the impression that trade policies can be developed 
in isolation from other development priorities, poverty and social 
considerations, and consultative processes, and can then simply be 
inserted in national policy documents. 
3. Trade Capacity Building 
"Trade capacity building" presents similar opportumtles and 
risks. Unlike trade mainstreaming, which is a relatively new and un-
tested concept, developing countries have had substantial experience 
as recipients of trade-related technical assistance (or technical coop-
86 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 83, at 4, 21. 
87 WoRLD BANK, supra note 82, at 6. 
88 Id. at 17. 
89 See, e.g., WoRLD BANK, supra note 76, at xvi. 
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eration).90 Unfortunately, the experience has been quite mixed. A 
proliferation of international, regional, and bilateral agencies has 
been involved in trade-related assistance to developing countries,91 
leading inevitably to inconsistency and duplication. There has also 
been a lack of clarity about the meaning of trade-related capacity 
building or technical assistance/cooperation. Since the 1970s, inter-
national, regional, and bilateral agencies have provided several types 
of trade-related support to developing countries in the areas of export 
marketing, trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and "trade capacity 
development," which the OECD defines as "building capacity by facili-
tating a country-driven participatory trade policy process as part of a 
comprehensive approach to overall development goals and poverty 
reduction strategies. ''92 
Trade-related technical assistance within the WTO initially fo-
cused on assisting developing country officials to understand the na-
ture of their countries' multilateral trade commitments and how to 
comply with them. However, one developing country commentator 
has noted that the short courses provided by the WTO were quite 
general and did not take account of developing countries' constraints 
in terms of specialized staff and resources.93 Other international and 
bilateral agencies have financed studies related to export promotion, 
but their recommendations did not take account of "supply con-
90 "Technical assistance" was the term originally used, but several development agen-
cies in the 1980s began to refer instead to "technical cooperation" to emphasize partner-
ship with developing countries. "Capacity building" is now the preferred term, suggesting 
developing country ownership, but all three terms continue to be used interchangeably. 
See genemlly Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4 (refers to technical assistance, technical 
cooperation, and capacity building); World Trade Organization, WTO Assistance for De-
veloping Countries, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/tct_e.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 25, 2004) (refers to technical assistance, technical cooperation, capacity building, 
and training). 
91 For example, the WTO lists 57 international, regional, and bilateral actors involved 
in trade-related technical assistance on its website. See World Trade Organization, List of 
Trade-Related Technical Assistance Providers, at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
devel_e/teccop_e/tecwebsites_e.htrn (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). A non-governmental or-
ganization that provides trade-related assistance to developing countries includes links to 41 
organizations on its website, including a large number not included in the WTO's list. See 
International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty, !LEAP Links, at http:/ /www.ileapini-
tiative.com/pages/links.htrn (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). A combined list could include over 
80 organizations. 
92 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 
23. 
93 See YASH TAN DON, EVALUATION Ot 'TO AND OTHER FoRMS OF TECHNICAL AssiS-
TANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN TH .nNTEXT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF AGREE-
MENTS 2-3 (2002), http:/ /www.ileapinitiative.com/pages/publicationsl. 
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straints" within developing countries or the effects of non tariff barri-
ers maintained by industrialized countries.94 There has also been a 
general perception that trade-related technical assistance, particularly 
if provided by other countries, is not "value-free" but is in fact "deeply 
political" and tends to further primarily the commercial and other 
interests of the donors.95 
The Integrated Framework, established in 1997, was intended to 
improve the effectiveness of trade-related technical assistance to LDCs 
through the coordinated efforts of the six agencies involved. However, 
a review completed in 2000 found that the Integrated Framework had 
not functioned well due to ( 1) different perceptions of LDCs and do-
nors about its objectives; (2) absence of linkages to overall develop-
ment assistance processes; (3) assistance that was not sufficiently de-
mand-driven; (4) weak administration; (5) insufficient coordination 
among agencies, LDCs, and donors; and (6) lack of adequate fund-
ing.96 Based on the review, the six core agencies approved a number 
of changes in the Integrated Framework to address these problems, 
including support for "the integration of trade, trade-related techni-
cal assistance, and capacity-building into the national development 
strategies and plans ofLDCs," to be led by the World Bank.97 
Following the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, the WTO 
adopted a new general strategy for technical cooperation that tracks 
both the Integrated Framework and the DDA in emphasizing techni-
cal support for "trade main streaming. "98 This mandate resulted in the 
creation of a new technical assistance fund-the Doha Development 
Agenda Global Trust Fund-and expanded commitments by interna-
tional and bilateral agencies under the Integrated Framework and 
other technical assistance programs.99 However, developing countries 
and civil society groups expressed concern about the vVTO's initial 
plan for the new technical assistance fund, which prioritized areas 
that did not necessarily reflect developing country interests, including 
controversial "Singapore issues" such as investment, competition, and 
94 Id. at 4. 
95 Id. at 12; see also PoWELL, supra note 59, at 6, 13. 
96 See WTO Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report oft he Review of the In-
tegrated Framework, "\\>'T /LDC/SWG/IF /1, at 9-11 (June 29, 2000). 
97 Communique from Heads of Six Core Agencies, supm note 84, at 3. 
98 See WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 83, at 3-4. 
99 See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION & ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SECOND jOINT WTO/OECD REPORT ON TRADE-RELATED 
TECHNICAL AssiSTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TRTA/CB) (2003), http:/ /www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htrn. 
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government procurement.I0° Similar criticism was leveled at UNC-
TAD's post-Doha program for technical assistance, which reportedly 
allocated 60% of funds to "Singapore issues," including investment, 
competition, and trade facilitation.lOl 
Since the World Bank has been designated to lead efforts to 
"mainstream" trade into PRSPs and other national development plan-
ning exercises, its trade capacity building activities under the DDA are 
likely to focus on integrating trade in the PRSP process. However, the 
type of technical support now contemplated-the drafting of "trade 
integration strategy" chapters for PRSPs based on "diagnostic trade in-
tegration studies"-is at odds with the principles and objectives of the 
PRSP process.102 Instead, the World Bank and other external agencies 
should support capacity building of government agencies, research in-
stitutes, and civil society groups to evaluate independently trade policy 
options and to assess their likely impacts-positive and negative-on 
poverty reduction, other national development goals, and development 
budgets.103 
4. Trade Diagnostic Studies 
As noted earlier, the World Bank's new trade agenda recognizes 
the need to analyze the distributional impact of trade and trade poli-
cies.104 This responds to recent calls from developing countries and 
civil society groups for systematic assessments of the development im-
pact of new trade proposals within the WTO.l05 It also reflects the 
100 Press Release, Bretton Woods Project eta!., Trade Policy Capacity-Building Statement: 
Joint Civil Society Statement Originally Prepared for Donor Pledging Meeting, 11 Mar. 2002 
(Mar. 25, 2002), http:/ /www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/knowledgebank/k27tradestat. 
htm. 
101 Chandrakant Patel, UNCTAD's Post-Doha Plan of Technical Assistance and Capacity 
Building, SEATINI BuLLETIN, Mar. 31, 2002, para. 1, at http:/ /www.seatini.org/bulletins/ 
b05-06.htm. 
102 See supra text accompanying note 86. 
103 See j. MICHAEL FINGER, THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE 
URUGUAY RouND 16 (2002), available at http:/ /www.adb.org/Economics/pdf/doha/ 
J_Michael_Finger.pdf ("There is also a considerable need for cost-benefit analysis, as a con-
siderable share of the development budget may be at stake[;] rate of return comparisons are 
a necessary part of good management. Development institutions will have to lead here, trade 
negotiations cannot."). 
1°4 WoRLD BANK, supra note 82, at 14. 
105 See, e.g., WTO General Council, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Dif-
ferential Treatment, WT /GC/W I 442 (Sept. 19, 2001 ); FowLER, supra note 7 (policy propos-
als at end of Section 3.4 include a call for governments to "undertake impact assessments 
of existing WTO agreements prior to negotiating future agreements, drawing on the ex-
pertise of specialized UN agencies and civil society groups, with a focus on poverty reduc-
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general work already being done by the World Bank, IMF, and some 
bilateral donors to develop tools to assess the poverty and social im-
pact of major economic policy changes (discussed in more detail in 
Part III below). 
The World Bank's recent Trade Progress Report indicates that the 
World Bank's main vehicle for analyzing the potential impact of trade 
reforms on vulnerable groups will be diagnostic trade integration stud-
ies (DTIS) similar to the pilot studies originally carried out in selected 
countries under the Integrated Framework.l06 As noted earlier, how-
ever, the general objective of these studies-which are typically carried 
out by trade consultants-is to identify opportunities for trade liberali-
zation and export promotion. Assuming that a DTIS team has the ex-
pertise to do poverty and social analysis, the main task of the team will 
continue to be identification of trade reforms and trading opportuni-
ties in a particular country. Therefore, a DTIS team will have little time 
or incentive to thoroughly analyze the possible poverty and social im-
pacts of the trade options being considered. In addition, based on past 
practice, DTIS teams are likely to consist mainly of foreign consultants 
who are generally disconnected from the PRSP process and who will 
have little time to consult widely with government ministries, parlia-
mentarians, civil society groups, and other stakeholders. 
As noted above, there is another process under way within the 
World Bank to develop tools to analyze the distributional effects of 
various economic reforms. Part III considers whether tl1ese tools would 
be more helpful than the DTIS approach to analyze possible impacts of 
trade policy changes on poor and vulnerable groups. 
III. PovERTY AND SociAL ANAL vsrs OF TRADE PoLiciEs 
Development banks and agencies originally developed tools for 
poverty and social analysis to improve the design of traditional devel-
opment projects. As they expanded their-work on the social dimensions 
of projects-for example, to include greater consultation with project 
beneficiaries and other project-affected groups and to address the 
needs of women, indigenous people, and ethnic minorities-they de-
veloped additional tools for social analysis, borrowing heavily from the 
tion, environmental sustainability, and gender equality. Financial and technical support 
needs to be provided to assist developing countries wishing to do this."). 
10s WoRLD BANK, supra note 82, at 15. 
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field research techniques of anthropologists and sociologists.107 The 
recent focus on poverty reduction has prompted the development of 
additional tools to carry out participatory poverty assessments and de-
sign appropriate interventions.108 
For some time, civil society groups and some governments have 
been urging the IMF and the World Bank to incorporate poverty and 
social assessments in the design of stabilization and adjustment loans 
in order to assess the potential impacts of proposed reforms on mar-
ginalized and vulnerable groups. 109 Similar recommendations have 
been made relating to their loans in support of PRSPs. For programs 
supported by its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the 
IMF now documents any poverty or social analysis that has been done 
in the relevant country on the measures included in the program. 
However, there has been little experience to date in undertaking this 
sort of analysis specifically for PRGF programs.no At the same time, 
the World Bank has begun to support governments in carrying out 
poverty and social impact analysis of major policy changes included in 
PRSPs, m and has also proposed options for carrying out poverty and 
social assessments in connection with its adjustment loans.ll2 Very few 
PRSPs to date have included analysis of distributional impacts. How-
ever, most recent PRSPs mention plans to carry out this type of analy-
107 See generally WoRLD BANK, SociAL ANALYSIS SouRCEBOOK: INCORPORATING SociAL 
DIMENSIONS INTO BANK-SUPPORTED PROJECTS Annex 1 (2003), http:/ /www.worldbank. 
org/ socialanalysissourcebook/ SocialAnalysisSourcebookFINAL2003Dec. pdf (evolution of 
social analysis at the World Bank). 
108 See id.; World Bank, Voices and Choices at a Macro Level: Action Learning Program 
on Participatory Processes for PRSP, at http:/ /www.worldbank.org/participation/web/ 
index.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
109 See INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AsSOCIATION (IDA) & INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND (IMF), REVIEW OF TilE PoVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER (PRSP) AP-
PROACH: MAIN FINDINGS para. 30, at 13 (2002), http:/ /www.worldbank.org/poverty/strat-
egies/review/findings.pdf. 
110 INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY FUND, ALIGNING TilE POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTII 
FACILITY (PRGF) AND THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER (PRSP) APPROACH: IsSUES 
AND OPTIONS paras. 34-37 (2003), http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/2003/eng/ 
042503.pdf. 
Ill WORLD BANK, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS-PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTA-
TION paras. 44-47 (2002), http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/prspgen/2002/eng/091102.pdf. 
112 WoRLD BANK, FRoM ADJUSTMENT LENDING TO DEVELOPMENT PoLicY SuPPORT 
LENDING: Kl:Y ISSUES IN THE UPDATE OF WORLD BANK POLICY 10-11 (2002), http:/ /wwwl. 
worldbank.org/ operations/ OP860Consultations/English Version/ 1 OPBP8.60pu blic06-06-
02pc.pdf. 
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sis for policy changes that are likely to have large distributional im-
pacts, including trade reforms.113 
As part of a larger work program supported by the United King-
dom's Department for International Development (DFID) and other 
donors, the World Bank has developed a User's Guide to Poverty And 
Social Impact Analysis (PS/A) and a related Toolkit for use by policy-
makers and analysts in developing countries, as well as by other devel-
opment agencies and civil society groups.114 Tools related to particular 
policy areas-including trade policy-will continue to be developed 
and refined. The same work program also included several pilot stud-
ies that have used PSIA tools to analyze a variety of economic policies 
and programs in developing countries, including tariff changes and 
export promotion programs. Initial reactions to the User's Guide have 
been mixed. 115 Nevertheless, the User's Guide provides a starting point 
for developing approaches to analyze the PSL'\ of trade policies and 
rules. Other relevant resources include a handbook on trade liberali-
zation and poverty recently developed by DFID.ll6 
PSIA is defined in the User's Guide as "analysis of the distribu-
tional impact of policy reforms on the well-being or welfare of differ-
ent stakeholder groups, with particular focus on the poor and vulner-
able."ll7 The User's Guide suggests a framework for PSIA built around 
seven key questions: 
113 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AssOCIATION, 
POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS-DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMEN-
TATION paras. 38-40, at 12-13 (2003), http:/ /poverty.worldbank.org/files/091503.pdf. 
114 See generally WoRLD BANK, A UsER's GuiDE TO PovERTY AND SociAL IMPACT ANALY-
SIS (2003), http:/ I poverty.worldbank.org/files/ 12685 _psiA_ U sers_Guide_-_Complete_-
_High_resolution_-_English_-_May_2003.pdf [hereinafter UsER's GuiDE]; WoRLD BANK, 
EVALUATING THE PoVERTY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES (TECH-
NIQUES AND TooLs) (Frant;:ois Bourguignon & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva eds., 2003), 
http:/ /poverty.worldbank.org/files/12995_toolkit.pdf. 
115 See generally GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL CooPERATION (GTZ), CoMMENTS ON "A 
UsER's GUIDE TO PovERTY AND SociAL IMPACT ANALYSis (DRAFT)" (2002); jENNIE RicH-
MOND & PAUL LADD, CHRISTIAN AID, PROVING TilE IMPACT: CHRISTIAN AID COMMENT ON "A 
UsER's GuiDE TO PovERTY AND SociAL IMPACT ANALYSIS (DRAFT)" (2002);JEFFREY D. SAus-
SIER, WoRLD LEARNING, FEEDBACK ON TilE USER's GUIDE TO PoVERTY AND SoCIAL IMPACT 
ANALYSIS (PSIA) (2002); KATHLEEN SELVAGGIO, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, COMMENTS ON 
"A UsER's GumE TO PoVERTY AND SociAL IMPACT ANALYsis" (DRAFT EDITION) AND RE-
PORTS oF PSIA PILOT STUDIES (2002). All of the above are located at http:/ I 
www.catholicrelief.org. See also WILKS & LEFRANt;:Ois, supra note 67, at 15-17. These com-
ments raise a variety of methodological and policy questions. See infra text accompanying 
note 134. 
116 See generally NEIL McCULLOCH ET AL., UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR INTER-
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND PoVERTY: A HANDBOOK (2001). 
117 UsER's GuiDE, supra note 114, at 1. 
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• What is being analyzed? 
• What is the welfare measure being assessed? 
• Whose welfare is being analyzed? 
• How are impacts channeled? 
• How do institutions affect outcomes? 
• When do impacts materialize? 
• What are the risks of an unexpected outcome?118 
The choice of welfare measures to be used in PSIA has become 
more complicated, as develop'ment agencies and governments now 
recognize poverty as multidimensional, including both quantifiable and 
qualitative aspects. Until recently, poverty analysis was typically based on 
income or consumption measures. However, as participatory poverty 
assessments have become more common, a variety of participatory and 
qualitative measures have been developed. 
Determining which groups to analyze also requires reflection. 
Some form of stakeholder analysis is needed to identify and disaggre-
gate the groups and subgroups most likely to be adversely affected by 
the particular policy change. Analysis based on broad categories such as 
"the poor" is unlikely to produce meaningful information. In the area 
of trade policy, for example, impacts may be experienced differently by 
groups in particular sectors or regions, by producers and consumers, 
and on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity, age, and other factors. 
Identifying likely transmission channels for a particular policy 
change is also critical. The User's Guide suggests five main transmission 
channels for most policy reforms: (1) employment; (2) prices (includ-
ing production, consumption, and wages); (3) access to goods and 
services (including public goods and services); (4) various assets;119 
and (5) transfers (including gifts, remittances, and subsidies) and 
taxes.12° For trade policy changes, resources such as the Global Poverty 
RepoTt 2001121 and DFID's handbook on trade liberalization and pov-
erty122 suggest additional transmission channels that are likely to be 
relevant These include government revenue (e.g., related to tariff 
changes) and adjustment costs (e.g., the social costs associated with 
118 See id. at 3-8. 
119 Individual and household assets that could be affected by a particular policy change 
include physical (e.g., housing), natural (e.g., land and water), human (e.g., education 
and skills), financial (e.g., savings and credit), and social assets (e.g., membership in social 
networks that provide access to information and resources). Id. at 5--6. 
120 I d. at 4-6. 
121 See AfRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ET AL., supra note 72, at 1-4. 
122 See McCuLLOCH ET AL., supra note 116, at 65-88. 
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the displacement of workers from adversely affected industries, the 
impact on unpaid household work, and the costs of complying with 
particular trade agreements).l 23 Finally, for trade policies and trade 
agreements, this Article argues that laws and regulations, particularly 
those that affect the welfare of poor and vulnerable groups, are other 
important transmission channels. 
Legal/regulatory analysis of changes in trade policies or trade 
rules has become more relevant as the scope ofVVTO and other trade 
agreements has widened to include services, intellectual property, 
health and food safety regulations, and any other regulations that may 
be deemed "technical barriers to trade." Careful examination of the 
text of a trade agreement is needed to assess its likely impact, includ-
ing any ambiguities in wording that might affect its implementation 
by parties to the agreement,124 and any new laws, regulations, institu-
tions, and procedures that may be required to implement it.125 Analyz-
ing a trade agreement's text can also identifY areas of possible tension 
or conflict between the agreement and a country's existing obliga-
tions under other international instruments, such as human rights or 
environmental treaties, or between the trade agreement and national 
laws or regulations already in place. Although related, the le-
gal/regulatory analysis suggested here can be distinguished from in-
stitutional analysis, which the User's Guide also recommends. Institu-
tional analysis is broader in scope and could include a review of the 
123 In addition to the cost of setting up administrative mechanisms, which may require 
legislation, additional staff, computer equipment, etc., some trade agreements entail other 
costs for developing countries. For example, in addition to significant compliance costs, 
the TRIPS Agreement also results in the transfer of substantial license and royalty fees, 
primarily from developing to developed countries. The World Bank estimated that China 
alone would experience a net outward transfer of about US$5.1 billion a year after enter-
ing into compliance with TRIPS. WoRLD BANK, supra note 6, at 137. 
124 For example, the World Bank has attributed the marginal impact of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in part to the drafting of the agreement, 
which substantially "back-loaded" industrialized countries' commitments to lift quotas on 
textile and clothing imports and framed those commitments in terms of overall import 
shares, which gave importing countries considerable leeway in selecting the imports to be 
liberalized. !d. at 51-52. 
125 International trade agreements, which are generally based on legal standards and 
administrative and judicial procedures of industrialized countries, impose significant com-
pliance costs on developing countries. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which requires the adoption of Western-style intellectual property legis-
lation and the establishment of government offices to review patent, copyright, and other 
claims. However, the cumulative effect of the Uruguay Round agreements is also 
significant. For example, it has been calculated that the agreements impose a total of 215 
different notification requirements on WTO members. TANDON, supra note 93, at 2. 
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functioning of government agencies, markets, community organiza-
tions, and informal networks, as well as legal or judicial institutions. 
Part IV of this Article describes in more detail a possible framework 
for legal/regulatory analysis of trade agreements, with gender as the 
main category of analysis. 
Another important element of any PSIA-which the User's Guide 
discusses in detail-is the gathering of data and the selection of ap-
propriate tools for analysis. In this area, the User's Guide cautions ana-
lysts to be aware of constraints in the availability of data, the difficulty 
of disentangling trade from other effects and tracing different im-
pacts over time, the capacity of government agencies, academia, and 
civil society organizations to use complex tools and methods, and the 
time available for data collection and analysis. 126 The User's Guide re-
views various data collection methods, both quantitative and qualita-
tive, and recommends the use of mixed methods to assess more fully 
the impacts of policy changes on poor and vulnerable groups.127 A 
wide variety of tools for data analysis is reviewed, including tools for 
• Stakeholder analysis; 
• Institutional analysis; 
• Impact analysis, using social science tools such as beneficiary and 
participatory assessments; 
• Impact analysis, using economic tools such as partial and general 
equilibrium models; 
• Social risk analysis; and 
• Monitoring and evaluation.12s 
Each of these tools has advantages and disadvantages, and a 
number of tools may not be practicable because of data and time con-
straints. In addition, the tools may not adequately capture the differ-
ent impacts of a policy change on particular social groups, especially 
qualitative impacts. For example, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models, which attempt to simulate key aspects of an entire 
economy or region, are extremely complicated to build, rely entirely 
on quantitative data, and simplify the economy in a number of ways. 
These models have also been criticized for not taking into account 
gender and other social differences. Over the past few years, however, 
several researchers and research teams have been working on alterna-
12s USER's GuiDE, supra note 114, at 39-40. 
127 /d. at 40. 
128 /d. at 9-38. 
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tive CGE models that better simulate the impact of particular policy 
changes on different social groups, including differentiations by gen-
der, rural/urban location, education, income level, occupation, and 
other factors. 129 There are also research networks, such as Micro Im-
pacts of Macro and Adjustment Policies (MIMAP), that are helping to 
build the economic modeling capacity of researchers and research 
institutes in developing countries. 130 However, there is much more 
work to be done in this area. 
Another general problem is that the household survey data on 
which many of these tools rely are collected at the household-rather 
than individual-level. Because data are not readily available on the 
allocation of income, consumption, and assets within households, a 
simplifYing assumption is made that all household members are 
treated equally. Thus, the tools may fail to capture different impacts 
on household members related to gender, age, or other factors. 131 
To assess the impact of trade policy changes, such as tariff reduc-
tions, a variety of tools can be used, including consumer assessments, 
demand/ supply analysis, and more elaborate economic models. How-
ever, the usefulness of these tools will depend on the availability of data, 
time limitations, and the types of impacts that seem to be most relevant. 
Moreover, since trade policy changes can extend to a wide variety of 
trade-related areas-including services, agriculture, investment, and 
various regulations-other tools and approaches may be needed. A 
general analytical challenge for the PSIA of any trade policy or agree-
ment is to disentangle its likely impact from the effects of other eco-
129 For example, several innovative research projects are being funded by DFID under 
its Globalization and Poverty Programme, located at the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex. Gender-aware economic modeling is also being done by members of 
the International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Eco-
nomics (http:/ /www.genderandmacro.org). See generally Channing Arndt & Finn Tapp, 
Agricultural Technology, Risk and Gender: A CGE Analysis of Mozambique, 28 WoRLD DEv. 1307 
(2000); Marzia Fontana & Adrian Wood, Modeling the Effects of Trade on Women, at Work and 
at Home, 28 WoRLD DEv. 1173 (2000); MARZIA FoNTANA, INTERNATIONAL FooD PoLICY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MODELING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON WoMEN, AT WoRK AND AT 
HoME: A CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2003) (compares CGE simulations for Bangladesh 
and Zambia with econometric and qualitative approaches). 
130 See WILKS & LEFRANt;:OIS, supra note 67, at 36-37 (appendix lists several economic 
research networks). 
131 See RAVI KANBUR, EDUCATION, EMPOWERMENT AND GENDER INEQUALITIES 5--6 (2002), 
available at http:/ /www.people.cornell.edu/pages/skl45/papers.htm; DAVID BooTH ET AL., 
THE STRATEGIC EXPORTS INITIATIVE IN UGANDA: POVERTY AND SoCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 18-
21 (2003), http:/ /poverty.worldbank.org/files/14689_Uganda_Final_PSIA.doc (pilot as-
sessment confirmed that commonly used poverty measurement surveys are not helpful in 
answering PSIAquestions about the composition of household incomes). 
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nomic policies, other trade agreements, and general changes in the 
local and global economies. 
The pilot PSIA studies supported by DFID and the World Bank 
provide an early indication of the tools and approaches that can be 
used to analyze trade policy changes, as well as the constraints and 
complexities involved. To date, most of the studies have relied on par-
tial equilibrium or CGE models. However, a pilot study of Uganda's 
Strategic Export Initiative found that the quantitative data available-
for example, from poverty measurement surveys-were inadequate 
for economic modeling purposes and relied instead on case studies of 
changes in farming and fishing households. The use of qualitative 
studies permitted the researchers to examine intra-household dynam-
ics, which led the team to make several recommendations to address 
underlying gender issues in the coffee and fishing sectors.132 
Based on the experiences in early PSIA studies, researchers and 
development agencies involved have concluded that PSIA tools can be 
very helpful in estimating the distributional effects of major policy 
changes. However, in light of the limited quantitative data available in 
most developing countries; the conceptual and technical difficulties in 
conducting ex ante analysis of policy reforms; and the limited resources 
and capacity of research institutes in developing countries; they stress 
the need to keep expectations realistic about future PSIA work. They 
strongly recommend the use of several data sources (including qualita-
tive as well as quantitative data) and several tools (such as economic, 
social, and institutional analysis). They also emphasize the importance 
of integrating PSIA in existing processes (such as the development of 
PRSPs and national development plans), ensuring that the PSIA is 
country-led, and involving a broad array of stakeholders.l33 
132 The assessment concluded that insufficient attention had been paid to the gender as-
pects of household-level supply constraints in the two sectors. Based on Ugandan case stud-
ies, the researchers warned that "women [in coffee-growing households] may withhold their 
labour or sabotage cash crops in several subtle ways because they know they will not benefit 
from the income earned." BooTH ET AL, supra note 131, at 25-26. The researchers also ob-
served that, because of men's spending priorities, "improvements in incomes controlled by 
men .... might not significantly enhance welfare for other household members, especially 
women and children." /d. at 26. For example, in the export fishing sector, increased cash 
income to many fishermen appeared to be "fuelling greater recreational expenditure by 
men, with reported increases in alcoholism and prostitution, rather than income sharing that 
might moderate the negative impacts on women and children." /d. at 27. 
133 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 110, at 16; INTERNATIONAL 
MoNETARY FUND & INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AssOCIATION, supra note 113, at 14-15; 
"THE NoRTH SEA MANIFESTo": AcTION PLAN ON PSIA FOR BILATERAL DoNORS 1-2 (2003), 
http:/ /www.brettonwoodsproject.org/ doc/adjustment/ psiamanifesto.doc. 
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These findings echo a number of issues and concerns that some 
development agencies and civil society groups had raised in com-
ments on the initial draft ofthe User's Guide. 134 These included: 
• The appropriate balance between quantitative and qualitative meas-
urement techniques. Several commentators found the User's Guide 
too slanted toward quantitative approaches, which would make it 
more difficult to assess impacts on qualitative aspects of poverty 
such as vulnerability and disempowerment. In particular, they 
noted that the "transmission channels" for tracing policy impacts 
on poor and marginalized groups are extremely complex, since 
their economic activities are predominantly in the informal sec-
tor and they may not even own the assets-such as Iand-on 
which their livelihoods depend. 
• "Technocratic" versus "participatory" approaches. Several also found 
the User's Guide too technocratic, which could restrict the use of 
PSIA tools to World Bank staff, consultants, and government stat-
isticians, rather than providing a variety of techniques that could 
be used by a wider group of developing country stakeholders. 
They noted that participatory assessment tools tend to be less 
costly and time-consuming, which would make PSIA more af-
fordable for developing country governments and civil society 
groups. 
• Intended users. Commentators supported the use of PSIA tools by 
World Bank staff to assess their own policy recommendations for 
developing countries. However, many felt it was even more im-
portant to support capacity building within developing countries 
so that government agencies, parliamentarians, research insti-
tutes, and civil society groups could independently assess develop-
ment policy options. 
• Purposes. Some commentators also expressed concern about the 
underlying purpose of PSIA. In their view, PSIA tools should be 
used to evaluate various economic policy options and not simply 
to validate a particular policy recommendation (or to identify 
mitigation measures to soften the negative impacts of a pre-
ordained policy). 
• Stakeholder identification and participation. Some commentators 
found the User's Guide's approach to "stakeholders" too narrowly 
focused on "vested interests" that could be expected to oppose 
134 See generally supra note 115. 
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particular economic policy changes. They noted that poor and 
marginalized groups tend not to be well-organized, and that 
affirmative steps would therefore need to be taken to ensure that 
their diffused interests were represented in a PSIA. They also 
suggested there should be greater acceptance of PSIA as part of a 
legitimate political process of formulating public policy with 
broad public input. 
• Relation to other national development processes. Finally, several 
commentators noted that PSIA has the potential to strengthen 
the formulation of national poverty reduction strategies and na-
tional development plans, but only if it is carried out in a trans-
parent and participatory manner. In addition, they recom-
mended that any PSIA should be linked to the monitoring and 
evaluation systems already being established under many national 
poverty reduction strategies (for example, to monitor a country's 
progress toward the MDGs). 
In the case of PSIA of trade issues, it is also important to link the 
analysis and outcomes to a country's various ongoing trade initiatives, 
which are likely to include not only WTO negotiations but also negotia-
tions at regional and bilateral levels. (For example, bilateral trade 
agreements may include more aggressive trade liberalization measures 
in certain sectors, which should be considered along with the country's 
more general commitments under wro and regional agreements.) 
PSIA could also be extremely useful to any countries involved in the 
protracted process of joining the WTO. This is especially the case for 
LDCs, which are increasingly being pressured by powerful WTO mem-
bers to agree to "WTO-plus" terms-for example, on liberalization of 
their agriculture sectors and broadening the coverage of their intellec-
tual property rules-as conditions for wro accession. 135 
There is still much work to develop high-quality, usable tools for 
PSIA of economic policy options, including analysis of changes in 
trade policies and rules. It is particularly important to ensure that 
these tools are of practical use to developing country governments, 
research institutes, and civil society groups, and that governments can 
use them to assess a variety of policy options in light of national con-
ditions, constraints, and development priorities. Increased funding of 
135 See generally CELINE CHARVERIAT & MARY KiRKBRIDE, 0XFAM INTERNATIONAL, CAM-
BODIA'S ACCESSION TO THE Wf0: How THE LAW OF THE jUNGLE Is APPLIED TO ONE OF THE 
WoRLD's PooREST CouNTRIES (2003), http: .ww.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/doc030902_cam-
bodia_accession.pdf. 
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research institutes and networks in developing countries is needed to 
support independent policy research and local debate on important 
national policy issues. Given the multidimensional nature of poverty 
and social exclusion, multidisciplinary approaches to PSIA should 
also be strongly encouraged. This is particularly important for PSIA 
studies in the trade area, which also need to factor in the messy tangle 
of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements to which most 
countries-including developing countries-are parties. Part IV pro-
vides an example of one multidisciplinary project that employed so-
cial, economic, and legal/regulatory approaches to analyze possible 
impacts of trade agreements from a gender perspective. 
IV. AN APPLICATION: GENDER ANALYSIS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS 
For over two decades, economists and other social scientists have 
been investigating the relationships between gender differences and 
trading patterns, focusing primarily on employment associated with 
export-promotion policies.136 Through formal economic modeling, 
empirical work, and policy analysis, they have demonstrated that trade 
policies do not necessarily have the same impact on men and women 
and that gender relations and differences themselves can influence 
trade policy outcomes.137 At the same time, feminist legal scholars 
136 NILUFER <;:AGATAY, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, TRADE, GENDER 
AND PovERTY 19 (2001). 
137 See generally LouRDES BENERIA, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: Eco-
NOMICS As IF ALL PEOPLE MATTERED (2003); MARZIA FoNTANA ET AL., UNITED KINGDOM 
DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL TRADE EXPANSION AND LIBER-
ALISATION: GENDER ISSUES AND IMPACTS (rev. ed. 1998), available at http:/ /www.ids.ac.uk/ 
bridge/Reports/re42c.pdf; SusAN P. joEKES, WoMEN IN THE WoRLD EcoNOMY: AN IN-
STRAW STUDY (1987); SusAN joEKES & ANN WEsToN, UNITED NATIONS FuND FOR WoMEN, 
WOMEN AND THE NEW TRADE AGENDA (1994); UNITED NATIONS, WoRLD SURVEY ON THE 
ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT: GLOBALIZATION, GENDER AND WORK (1999); MARIAMA 
WILLIAMS, CoMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN THE MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADING SYSTEM: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
(2003); WoMEN, MEN AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR (june Nash & Maria 
Patricia Fernandez-Kelly eds., 1983); Lourdes Beneria et al., Special Issue on Globalization 
and Gende1; 63 FEMINIST EcoN. (2000); Niliifer Cagatay et al., Special Issue on Gender, Ad-
justment and Macroeconomics, 23 WoRLD DEv. (1995); Diane Elson & Ruth Pearson, Nimble 
Fingers Make Cheap Workm: An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufac-
turing, 7 FEMINIST REV. 87 (1981); Caren Grown et al., Special Issue on Growth, Trade, Finance 
and Gender Inequality, 28 WoRLD DEv. (2000); Linda YC. Lim, Women s Work in Export-
Oriented Industries: The Politics of a Cause, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN AND WoRLD 
DEVELOPMENT (Irene Tinker ed., 1990); Rekha Mehra & Sarah Gammage, Trends, Counter-
trends, and Gaps in Women's Employment, 27 WoRLD DEv. 533 (1999) (first of six articles ex-
amining implications of trends in women's employment in developing and developed 
countries); see also generally UNCTAD, TRADE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER 
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have drawn attention to the various ways in which international legal 
frameworks-including international economic law-reflect and ex-
tend typically "masculine" assumptions and norms and reinforce the 
dominant position of major industrialized countries in world politics 
and the world economy, resulting in the exclusion or marginalization 
of alternative perspectives and interests. 138 Their work has also ex-
plored the tensions between international economic law and human 
rights law and the implications for women and societies in general. 
Reflecting growing concern about the potential adverse impact 
of trade liberalization on women, particularly in developing countries, 
the Beijing Platform for Action, which was adopted unanimously at 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, called on all gov-
ernments to "ensure that national policies related to international 
and regional trade agreements do not have an adverse impact on 
women's new and traditional economic activities."139 This call has 
been taken up by several international and regional bodies, including 
UNCTAD, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APE C), the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the Southern Common Market (MERCO-
SUR), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
(1999) (papers prepared for Pre-UNCTAD X Expert Workshop on Trade, Sustainable 
Development and Gender, Geneva, July 12-13, 1999). 
138 See generally HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, BoUNDARIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAw: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000); REcoNCEIVING REALITY: WoMEN AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Kate E. Andrias, Gender, Work and the 
NAFFA Labor Side Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 521 (2003) (one of numerous articles on this 
topic); Nandini Gunewardena, &inscribing Sttbalternity: International Financial Institutions, 
Development and Women's Marginality, 7 UCLA]. INT'L L. & FoREIGN AFF. 201 (2003); Liane 
M. Jarvis, Women s Rights and the Public Morals Exception of GAIT Article XX, 22 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 219 (2000); Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" 
Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 1 (2002); 
Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimiza-
tion of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT'L LJ. 381 (2000); Anne Or-
ford, Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 171 (1998); Anne Orford & Jennifer Beard, Critique and 
Comment: "Making the State Safe for the Market: The World Banks World Development Report 
1997," 22 MELB. U. L. REv. 195 (1998); Sundhya Pahuja, Technologies of Empire: IMF Condi-
tionality and the &inscription of the North/South Divide, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 749 (2000); 
Sundhya Pahuja, Trading Spaces: Locating Sites for Challenge Within International Trade Law, 14 
AusTL. FEMINIST LJ. 38 (2000); Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and 
Postmodern Possibilities of International Law, 33 VAND. J. ThANSNAT'L L. 503 (2000); Shelley 
Wright, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Women and the Global Eco-
nomic Order-A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 861 (1995); see also gener-
ally Eugenia McGill, Gender Issues in International Tmde and Investment, in A CoMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Arthur Appleton et al. eds., forthcoming). 
139 REPORT oF THE FouRTH WoRLD CoNFERENCE oN WoMEN, BEIJING, 4-5 SEPT. 1995, 
Annex II,, 165(k), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1995). 
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which have established advisory groups or offices to ensure that gen-
der concerns are reflected in their activities related to trade and for-
eign investment. In 2003, a U.N. interagency task force on gender and 
trade was created, headed by UNCTAD, to coordinate research, ca-
pacity building, and advocacy activities within the U.N. system. Gen-
der and trade has also been identified as a cross-cutting issue to be 
considered at UNCTAD XI, taking place in Sao Paolo in June 2004.140 
A. Gender Assessment Project Overview 
Building on these developments, the Coalition for Women's 
Economic Development and Global Equality (Women's EDGE Coali-
tion), which advocates for improvements in women's and girls' eco-
nomic opportunities, rights, and well-being in developing countries, 
recently commissioned a study by two economists and the author of 
this Article to develop a possible framework for carrying out gender 
assessments of trade and investment agreements.l 41 The study sup-
ported Women's EDGE Coalition's efforts to persuade the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to carry out gender assess-
ments of new trade and investment agreements being negotiated be-
tween the United States and other countries, with a particular empha-
sis on impacts in developing countries. Women's EDGE Coalition 
based its argument for gender assessments in part on the precedent 
of U.S. Executive Order 13141, which requires the U.S. government, 
140 Mainstreaming Gender to Promote Opportunities Through the Increased Contribution of 
Women to Competitiveness, U.N. TDBOR, 6th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 5, at 8, U.N. 
Doc. TD/B/COM.3/44 (2001), http:/ /www.unctad.org/en/docs/ /c3d44.en.pdf; WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 137, app. 3 (gender mainstreaming mechanisms in regional economic 
bodies); UNCTAD, First Session of the Preparatory Committee for UNCTAD XI, Trade 
and Development Board, Geneva, at http:/ /www.unctad.org/Templates/Webflyer.asp?doc 
ID=4214&intltemiD=2068&lang=l (Oct. 15, 2003); UNCTAD, Meeting of the UN Inter-
Agency Task Force on Gender and Trade, at http:/ /www.unctad.org/Templates/Meet-
ing.asp?m=7308&intitemiD=l942&lang=l (last visited Apr. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Gen-
der & Trade Task Force Meeting]. 
141 See generally SARAH GAMMAGE ET AL., CoALITION FOR WoMEN's EcoNoMIC DEVELOP-
MENT AND GLOBAL EQUALITY, fRAMEWORK FOR GENDER AssESSMENTS OF TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT AGREEMENTS (2002). The Women's EDGE Coalition recently published a country 
case study based on this framework. MARCELINE WHITE ET AL., WOMEN's ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT AND GLOBAL EQUALITY, NAFTA AND THE FTAA: A GENDER ANALYSIS OF EMPLOY-
MENT AND PoVERTY IMPACTS IN AGRICULTURE (2003). Both reports can be obtained from 
the Women's EDGE Coalition (http:/ /www.womensedge.org). Another country case study 
focusing on Jamaica is under way and is expected to be published in late 2004. 
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through the Council on Environmental Quality and the USTR, to 
conduct environmental reviews of proposed trade agreements.l42 
The gender assessment study was conceived as multidisciplinary 
and combined social, economic, and legal/regulatory analyses within a 
human development and human rights framework. The study included 
a review of relevant social science, trade policy, and legal literature; the 
development of socioeconomic and legal/regulatory frameworks for 
analysis and several preliminary assessment tools; and policy recom-
mendations for conducting gender assessments, including the partici-
pation of a wide range of stakeholders in the process. 
The analytical frameworks developed in the study were based on 
several stylized facts that help to explain why trade liberalization may 
have gender-differentiated impacts and why gender differences in turn 
may affect the outcome of trade policies)43 These include the observa-
tion that, in most countries, women and girls typically have less access 
to productive resources such as land, credit, education, and occupa-
tional training. In addition, in most countries the labor market is 
strongly segregated along gender lines, with men holding relatively bet-
ter-paying and more secure jobs than women. Furthermore, women 
bear most of the burden of reproduction, and social norms reinforce 
the asymmetric division of labor in the household, with the result that 
142 Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 18, 1999) (Environmental Re-
view of Trade Agreements); see also CoUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & THE UNITED 
STATES 'TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13141, http:/ /www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/12/guides.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
148 The term "gender" refers here to socially constructed expectations, roles, responsi-
bilities, and limitations ascribed to men and women in a particular society or group, which 
may or may not be related to their biological differences and reproductive roles. "Gender 
analysis" refers to methods used to identify and understand the differences in the lives of 
women and men, as well as the differences among groups of women and men related to 
factors such as age, marital status, class, ethnicity, and location. It considers roles, activities, 
access to resources, opportunities, and constraints within households, communities, and 
markets, and at national and international levels. "Gender assessment" refers here to the 
use of gender analysis to examine the different impacts of particular government policies, 
laws, or regulations on women and men (and different impacts among groups of women 
and men). See PATRICIA ALEXANDER & SALLY BADEN, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUD-
IES, GLOSSARY ON MACROECONOMICS FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 3 (BRIDGE Report No. 
48, 2000), http:/ /www.ids.ac.uk/bridge/Reports/re48c.pdf; AsiA-PACIFIC EcoNOMIC Co-
OPERATION SECRETARIAT, APEC GUIDE FOR GENDER ANALYSIS, http:/ /www.apecsec.org.sg/ 
apec/apec_groups/other_apec_groups/gender_focal_point_network.downloadlinks.0002. 
LinkURL.Download.ver5.1.9 (last visited Apr. 25, 2004); CANDIDA MARCH ET AL., OxFAM 
GB, A GUIDE TO GENDH \'IALYSIS FRAMEWORKS 18 (1999); ORGANIZATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC Co-oPERATION A .VELOPMENT, DAC GuiDELINES FOR GENDER EQUALITY AND 
WOMEN'S EMPOWERMEN'I .. DEVELOPMENT Co-OPERATION 9-11 (1998), http:/ /www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/56/46/28313843.pdf. 
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women are generally responsible for maintenance of the household, 
including care of children and elders. This can lead in turn to different 
consumption and time use patterns among women and men. Social 
norms in certain societies also restrict women's mobility and participa-
tion in economic and civic activities outside the home. These character-
istics tend to overlap and reinforce each other. The net effect, however, 
is that men and women face different opportunities and constraints 
that can affect their ability to benefit from trade liberalization or for-
eign investment, or to adjust to changes resulting from these trends.144 
The frameworks were also based on an understanding that cate-
gories such as ''women" and "men" are generally inadequate for pur-
poses of social analysis and need to be further disaggregated to reflect 
differences based on age, race or ethnicity, class or caste, household 
status, citizenship status, location, and other factors. In the area of 
trade liberalization and foreign investment, this disaggregation of so-
cial categories is particularly important, since the most vulnerable so-
cial groups are likely to be located at the intersections of multiple so-
cial categories (such as undocumented migrant women or indigenous 
women who are also heads of households). 
B. Socioeconomic Analysis 
The socioeconomic framework developed in the gender assess-
ment study is built on a gender critique of mainstream economic analy-
sis of trade. Mainstream trade theory, which is based on several unreal-
istic assumptions about economies (such as perfect competition and 
full employment), identifies four principal channels through which 
trade liberalization will affect the economy and individual actors: (1) 
the prices of goods and services; (2) employment; (3) wages; and (4) 
consumption of goods and services.145 The framework identifies ways in 
which market imperfections-including market power, unemployment, 
restrictions on labor mobility, and gender inequality-can cause these 
"transmission channels" to operate differently from what trade theory 
144 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 4-Q; see also CAGATAY, supra note 136, at 19; 
ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 143, at 12-
13, 29-34; UNITED NATIONS, supra note 137, at xvi.-xix; UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
FUND FOR WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2000, at 16-36 (2000); UNITED 
NATIONS, THE WoRLD's WoMEN 2000: TRENDS AND STATISTICS, at xi.i.i.-xx (2000); WoRLD 
BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH GENDER EQUITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES 
AND VoicE 31-72 (2001). 
145 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 13-23; see also CAGATAY, supra note 136, at 16-
18. 
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would otherwise predict. Thus, while trade theory suggests that a sector 
with a comparative advantage in low-cost labor would expand produc-
tion for export under trade liberalization-resulting in increased de-
mand for labor and increased wages for workers in that sector-a 
number of factors can operate to depress or freeze wages in an export 
sector, including unemployment, capital mobility, a shift to subcontract-
ing, and gender segregation and discrimination. For example, it has 
been argued that gender segregation and discrimination in labor mar-
kets can explain the findings of persistent gender wage gaps in newly 
industrialized, export-oriented countries where the workers employed 
in export industries are predominantly women.l46 
The framework extends the traditional analysis of the four 
transmission channels to include the effects of trade liberalization on 
conditions of work (as well as the availability of jobs) and the alloca-
tion of consumption within households, and it also considers effects 
on access to public goods and services such as health care, education, 
and water supply. Finally, the framework attempts to take account of 
trade impacts on the informal sector and the reproductive sector, nei-
ther of which is captured in traditional economic analysis. In terms of 
the tools available for socioeconomic analysis, the gender study con-
siders a variety of economic models and ways that they could be 
modified to reflect better the gender differences in economies, as well 
as areas for empirical research. For purposes of both analysis and 
monitoring, the study notes the need to collect gender-disaggregated 
data, including intra-household data, and identifies a number of indi-
cators that could be relevant for monitoring impacts of trade policies 
and agreements. The study also stresses the need to anticipate imple-
mentation costs and implementation issues related to the trade policy 
or agreement that is under review. 
C. Legal/Regulatory Analysis 
The legal/regulatory framework developed under the gender 
assessment study provides for analysis of a particular trade or invest-
ment agreement on three levels: (1) the text of the agreement itself; 
(2) related implementation and enforcement mechanisms; and (3) 
the agreement's possible interactions with the various laws and norms 
that influence gender roles and women's opportunities and con-
146 See generally Stephanie Seguino, Accounting for Gender in Asian Economic Growth, 6 
FEMINIST EcoN. 27 (2000); Stephanie Seguino, Gender Inequality and Economic Growth: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, 28 WoRLD DEV. 1211 (2000). 
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straints in a particular country.147 Under this approach, a trade or in-
vestment agreement would first be examined to identify any overtly 
"gender-biased" provisions or apparently "gender-neutral" provisions 
that might have a disparate effect on women and men (or on groups 
of women and men) in light of their different socioeconomic circum-
stances. For example, U.S. free trade agreements with Chile, Jordan, 
and Singapore commit each party to ensure that its labor laws are 
consistent with internationally recognized labor rights and to enforce 
these laws effectively.148 However, the agreements fail to include the 
rights to nondiscrimination in employment and equal pay in their 
definitions of "internationally recognized labor rights," even though 
these two rights are clearly included in the Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO)l49 and are particularly important to women and other histori-
cally disadvantaged groups. In contrast, the ILO conventions on non-
discrimination and equal pay are specifically included in the special 
147 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 23-27. 
148 Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, art. 6.6, U.S.:Jordan, 
http:/ /www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/textagr.pdf; United States-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, art. 18.8, U.S.-Chile, http:/ /www.ustr.gm'/new/fta/Chile/ 
final/; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, art. 17.7, U.S.-Sing., 
http:/ /www.ustr.gov. (The labor cooperation mechanisms established under the U.S. trade 
agreements with Chile and Singapore mention the possibility of cooperative activities to 
eliminate employment discrimination, but the dispute settlement procedures of the agree-
ments apply only to allegations that a state party has failed to effectively enforce its labor laws 
directly relating to "internationally recognized labor rights," which are defined in the agree-
ments to exclude nondiscrimination and equal pay.) The U.S. Trade Act of 2002, which sets 
standards for the negotiation of future trade agreements by the USTR, similarly excludes the 
core rights to nondiscrimination and equal pay from its definition of "core labor standards" 
that must be protected under future trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 3813(6) (2002). This 
treatment is consistent with the exclusion of these labor rights under the U.S. Generalized 
System of Preferences and other preferential trade arrangements between the United States 
and developing countries. See generally Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker 
Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Laws, 17 YALE J. lNT'L L. 173 ( 1992); see also generally Adelle 
Blackett, Whither Social Clauser Human Rights, Tmde Theory and Treaty lntCJpretation, 31 CoLUM. 
HuM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 22 (1999). 
149 See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (lLO), lLO DECLARATION ON 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK (1998), http:/ /www.ilo.org/declaration. 
Even the full set ofiLO core labor rights does not address all the needs of women workers, 
such as the need for maternity leave and childcare. However, some of these needs are ad-
dressed by other ILO conventions. 
418 Boston College International & Compamtive Law Review [Vol. 27:371 
incentive arrangements for the protection of labor rights under the 
European Community's Generalized System of PreferencesY'>0 
In terms of implementation and enforcement mechanisms, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) generally requires WfO mem-
bers to base their sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on interna-
tional standards promulgated by organizations such as the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission.I51 However, these organizations have long-
standing ties to industry members and associations and have not his-
torically been open to consumer and other citizens' groups.152 It is 
therefore possible that the standards set by these bodies may not 
reflect the concerns of women, particularly from developing coun-
tries. The requirement of the SPS Agreement that sanitary and phyto-
sanitary regulations must be "based on scientific principles and ... 
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence"153 also has gen-
der implications. Until recently, less medical research was devoted to 
women's health issues, and therefore less data may be available on the 
long-term effects on women of exposure to certain pollutants and 
other harmful substances.I54 Thus, should a country choose to regu-
late a particular substance more stringently than the applicable inter-
national standard in order to address health risks to women, it could 
be more difficult to establish a sufficient scientific basis for the regula-
tion under the SPS Agreement. Moreover, under the WfO's dispute 
settlement procedures, dispute panels also have considerable 
flexibility to engage experts to advise on scientific and other technical 
matters. However, there is no assurance that the panel members-
who are primarily trade law experts-or their expert advisors will be 
15° Council Regulation 2501/01 of 10 December 2001 Applying a Scheme of General-
ised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001 OJ. 
(L 346/1), http:/ I europa.eu.int/ comm/ external_relations/ ca/ doc/reg01_en.pdf. 
151 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, arts. 3.1, 3.4, Annex A, para. 3, wro Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
152 See David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organi-
zation: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 865,885-89 (2000). 
155 SPS Agreement, supra note 151, art. 2.2. 
154 See WoRLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GENDER AND HEALTH, WHO/FRH/WHD/98.16 
(1998), http:/ /www.who.int/reproductive-health/pages_resources/listing_gender.en.html. 
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sensitive to women's health concerns in their review of health-based 
regulations.155 
Turning to the possible interactions between trade and invest-
ment agreements, on the one hand, and other legal frameworks rele-
vant to women and other social groups, on the other, a few general 
points should be considered. First, there is an array of formal and in-
formallaws and norms that shapes the status and rights of groups in a 
society. These may include international treaty commitments a coun-
try has made-for example, through ratification of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and various ILO conventions-as well as provisions of the 
national constitution, statutes, regulations, administrative directives, 
and judicial rulings. In many countries, the picture is complicated 
further by the existence of religious, traditional, or customary laws, 
which may be codified in whole or in part and interpreted and en-
forced by a separate system of courts. Second, the situation of women, 
even within the same country, may vary greatly depending on other 
social factors such as religion, ethnicity, class, and geographic loca-
tion. Third, there are both institutional and practical factors that can 
influence the enforcement of laws and the access to justice for women 
and certain other social groups.I56 
With these points in mind, the gender assessment study devel-
oped a tentative "checklist" of laws and norms relevant to the situation 
of women and other social groups, against which a trade or invest-
ment agreement could be evaluated. The checklist includes the fol-
lowing general categories: 
• The country's key international commitments relevant to 
women, including treaties such as CEDAW and plans of action to 
implement international programs such as the Beijing Platform 
for Action; 
• Provisions of the national constitution that are particularly rele-
vant to women and other disadvantaged groups, such as guaran-
tees of nondiscrimination and equality; 
• National and subnational laws and regulations particularly rele-
vant to women and other disadvantaged groups, such as: 
-Non-discrimination and equal treatment laws; 
155 See Craig Thorn & Marinn Carlson, The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 31 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 841, 852-53 (2000). 
156 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 24-26. 
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-Affirmative action and other laws providing special treat-
ment, such as small business assistance and government pro-
curement preferences; and 
-Gender neutral laws, such as those pertaining to fair 
wages, food labeling, and health and safety; 
• Gaps, lapses, or biases in the application or enforcement of laws 
that benefit women and other vulnerable groups, such as labor 
laws; and 
• Religious, traditional, or customary laws and practices, especially 
relating to rights to land and other assets_157 
Not all of these categories would be relevant in each case, and 
the scope of the analysis would also depend on the time and resources 
available. The last two categories were included in the checklist to en-
sure that provisions of a trade or investment agreement do not rein-
force the inequitable treatment of women that may result from gaps in 
the enforcement of beneficial laws or from the application of certain 
religious, traditional, or customary laws or norms. 
Two examples of areas where this comparative approach could be 
useful are small business assistance and government procurement pref-
erences for women and minority-owned businesses. In the case of small 
business assistance, the so-called "green light" subsidies originally al-
lowed under Article 8 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) included government 
assistance to "disadvantaged regions," but not to economically disad-
vantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities.l58 Thus, a na-
tional or local government program to provide low-cost loans, tax cred-
its, training, or other support to women or minority entrepreneurs in 
an export manufacturing industry might conceivably be challenged as 
an actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement.159 Similarly, pro-
157 !d. at 26-27. 
158 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 8.2(b), 
\VTQ Agreement, supm note 1. Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
RouND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
159 See id. arts. 1-2 (definition of subsidy and specificity requirement), arts. 5-7 (treat-
ment of actionable subsidies). This analysis is relevant primarily to small business assis-
tance provided to exporters in industrialized countries, since the SCM Agreement accords 
special and differential treatment to developing countries. See id., art. 27. At the Doha 
Ministerial Conference, developing countries put forward a proposal to treat a number of 
development-related measures-similar to the "green light" subsidies that lapsed in 1999-
as non-actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. The Ministerial Conference 
agreed that this proposal should be considered further by the appropriate "WTO body 
(most likely the "WTO Committee on SCM). See \VTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 
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grams to assist women and minority-owned businesses in obtaining 
government contracts could run afoul of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment on Government Procurement (AGP), depending on the type of 
assistance program and specific commitments that the state party has 
made under the agreement.160 
D. Gender Analysis of Ap;~iculture (Illustmtion) 
One example-the agriculture sector-will illustrate the types of 
issues that can be identified through collaborative analysis that con-
siders social, economic, and legal/regulatory factors. 
A majority of the female labor force in developing countries is 
engaged in agriculture-62% in 1990.161 Although women are in-
volved in production of both cash and subsistence crops, research in-
dicates that they are primarily responsible for household food pro-
duction in several regions-70 to 80% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 65% 
in Asia.162 However, extensive literature documents the constraints 
that women farmers face due to limited access to and rights over land, 
limited access to credit and other inputs, and neglect by agricultural 
extension services.163 
Market liberalization and promotion of export crops have had 
ambiguous employment effects on women farmers. For example, in 
some regions, women's representation in the agricultural labor force 
has increased as more men migrate to jobs in manufacturing or other 
10, para. 10.2. The Committee on SCM could also consider a carve-out for government 
assistance to enterprises owned by women or other historically disadvantaged groups. 
160 See generally Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 1, Annex 4, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter AGP]. The coverage of the AGP is limited to the entities 
that each party has included fn its commitment schedule. ff a government entity is in-
cluded in the commitment schedule without exception, the entity's assistance to women or 
minority bidders for government contracts could ~e challenged by another state party to 
the AGP if the assistance discriminates against foreign suppliers or creates an "unnecessary 
obstacle to international trade." Id. arts. Ill, VI(l). However, the AGP provides certain 
exceptions, including one for the provision of products and services of handicapped per-
sons. Id. art. XXIII(2). The agreement also provides special and differential treatment for 
developing countries and least developed countries. I d. art. V. 
1s1 Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 538. 
162 LYNN R. BROWN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FooD PoLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GEN-
ERATING FOOD SECURITY IN THE YEAR 2020: WOMEN AS PRODUCERS, GATEKEEPERS, AND 
SHOCK ABsoRBERS (2020 Vision Brief No. 17, 1995), http:/ /www.ifpri.org/2020/briefs/ 
number17.htm. 
165 See, e.g., WoRLD BANK, supra note 144, at 51-52, 120-22; Cheryl R. Doss, Designing 
Agricultural Technology for African Women Farmers: Lessons from 25 YeaTs of Expe1ience, 29 
WoRLD DEv. 2075,2077-78 (2001); Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 539. 
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off-farm work.164 However, expansion of export crops has also dis-
placed women farmers from land they had used for subsistence farm-
ing, and many of these displaced women have taken seasonal jobs as 
agricultural workers. In Mrica and Latin America, women make up 
the large majority of the workforce in nontraditional agricultural ex-
ports such as flowers and specialty vegetables. While these jobs pro-
vide cash income, they are also characterized by low wages, health 
hazards, and seasonality.l65 Market liberalization has also created new 
opportunities for women involved in food processing and trading, 
although they tend to be concentrated in small-scale operations. In 
general, the liberalization of agriculture markets has benefited mainly 
medium and large-scale commercial producers and traders. Women 
farmers and traders, who generally operate on a smaller scale, have 
been found less likely to benefit. It is especially difficult for small 
farmers, including women, to compete with heavily subsidized agri-
cultural imports.l66 
Case studies from Mrica have shown that, where women are pri-
marily responsible for household food production but also help with 
cash crop production as unpaid family laborers, they are likely to real-
ize little or no direct benefit from programs to increase production of 
cash crops for export. In many cases, they may be required by male 
family members to give up part of their subsistence farmland for cash 
crop production, which further weakens their property rights and 
may also threaten their family's food security if they are no longer 
able to grow subsistence crops. Women farmers may therefore resist 
or undermine male family members' efforts to expand production of 
export crops. This analysis provides one possible explanation for the 
weak "supply response" that has been observed by economists where 
the prices of cash crops have been liberalized, particularly in Mrica.l67 
164 Mehra & Gammage, supra note 137, at 539. 
165 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 137, at 11-12. 
166 See SALLY BADEN, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, GENDER IsSUES IN AGRI-
CULTURAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION, at ii, iv-vi (BRIDGE Report No. 41, 1998), http:/ I 
www.ids.ac.uk/bridge/Reports/re41c.pdf; see also MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 43, at 133-
35; WILLIAMS, supra note 137, at 62-68. 
167 See generally James M. Warner & D.A. Campbell, Supply Response in an Agrarian Econ-
omy with Non-Symmetric Gender Relations, 28 WoRLD DEv. 1327 (2000); see also BADEN, supra 
note 166, at 25-27. As discussed in Part ill above, the pilot PSIA study of Uganda's Strate-
gic Export Initiative considered similar studies from Uganda and concluded that more 
attention should be paid to the gender aspects of household-level supply constraints in the 
coffee and fish sectors. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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On its face, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture does 
not exhibit any overt gender bias. The agreement extends "special 
and differential treatment" to developing countries in several re-
spects. Moreover, a number of its "green box" exemptions from ag-
gregate limits on domestic supports-for example, for extension serv-
ices, stockholding for food security, domestic food aid, and disaster 
relief-would seem to be beneficial to women farmers in developing 
countries.168 However, the general goal of the agreement is to facili-
tate agricultural exports. As noted above, women farmers in many de-
veloping countries are primarily responsible for household food pro-
duction; therefore, household food security and sufficiency are high 
priorities.169 The Agreement on Agriculture includes a domestic sup-
port exemption for "food security" stockpiles. However, the agree-
ment treats food security in terms of government (or international) 
support rather than household self-sufficiency.t7o 
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, one of the propos-
als put forward by developing countries, with strong support from civil 
society groups, was for the creation of a "development box."l71 Among 
other things, this proposal allows developing countries to exclude 
specified staple crops from their tariff reduction commitments and also 
allows governments to give greater assistance to poor farmers. Similar 
proposals were floated at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun 
168 See generally Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, WTO Agreement, 
supra note 1, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture] (bases for exemptions from 
commitments to reduce domestic supports). 
169 Food security is not only a fundamental concern but a fundamental human right, 
reflected in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 14 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
(addresses the situation of rural women in general). The U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR) recently analyzed the liberalization of agriculture trade and 
the Agreement on Agriculture from a human rights perspective, taking into account the 
right to food and the right to development. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Report of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Reso-
lution 2001/32, at 12-19, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/2002/54 (Jan. 15, 2002). 
17o See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 168, Annex 2, para. 3 (exemption from 
domestic support commitments for accumulation of public food stocks). 
171 See ACP Declaration on the Fourth Ministerial Conference, Communication from Kenya, 
WT /L/ 430, para. 20 (Nov. 9, 2001); Declaration of the Group of 77 and China on the Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference at Doha, Communication from Cuba, WT /L/ 424, para. 9 (Oct. 24, 2001); 
DUNCAN GREEN & SHISHIR PRIYADARSHI, CATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT, 
PROPOSAL FOR A "DEVELOPMENT Box" IN THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 12-15 
(2001), http:/ /www.cafod.org.uk/policy/devbox.htm. 
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for a "special products" category and a "special safeguard mechanism" 
to address the food security and rural development needs of develop-
ing countries.l72 These proposals address the general bias of the 
Agreement on Agriculture toward agricultural exports. However, they 
would need to be complemented by gender-sensitive agriculture poli-
cies and targeted resources in order to benefit women farmers, who 
have historically been excluded from agricultural extension services, 
credit programs, and other support.173 
E. Gender in Tmde Policy-Making 
The gender assessment study described here also recognized the 
importance of ensuring that women's interests and concerns are rep-
resented in the processes for formulating trade policy. Historically, 
women and other segments of civil society have not been included in 
these processes; in contrast, private sector interests have been actively 
engaged in trade policy formulation, lobbying of legislators on trade 
issues, and applications for trade remedies. 174 However, the growing 
172 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICUL-
TURE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE WTO: PosT-CANCUN OUTLOOK REPORT 26 (2003), 
http:/ /www.ictsd.org/issarea/ag/products/ AgricultureNegotiations9.pdf; United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization, A Special Agricultural Safeguard (SAS): Buttressing the Marlut 
Access RefoTms of Developing Countries, in FAO PAPERS ON SELECTED IssuEs RELATING TO THE 
WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE (2002), http:/ /www.fao.org/DOCREP /005/\3733£/ 
y3733e05.htm; see also AMERICAN LANDS ALLIANCE ET AL., CoLLECTIVE CoMMENTS RE: DoHA 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION 4 (2002), http:/ /www.ciel.org/Publications/Doha_Comments_ 
250ct02.pdf; MALHOTRA ET AL., supra note 43, at 138-41; TIM RUFFER & PAOLO VERGANO, 
UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AN AGRICULTURE SAFE-
GUARD MECHANISM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17-27 (2002), http:/ /www.dfid.gov.uk; 
KEVIN WATKINS, 0XFAM INTERNATIONAL, RUNNING INTO THE SAND: WHY FAILURE AT THE 
CANCUN TRADE TALKS THREATENS THE WORLD's PooREST PEOPLE 16-17 (2003), http://www. 
oxfam.org/ eng/pdfs/pp030902_cancun_sand.pdf; WoRLD BANK, supra note 76, at 223. 
173 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 39; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 137, at 68-74. 
Although the Doha Ministerial Declaration did not endorse the "development box" pro-
posal, it did include a commitment "to enable developing countries to effectively take ac-
count of their development needs, including food security and rural development." Minis-
terial Declaration, supra note 4, para. 13. 
174 Serious gender imbalances exist in many national trade ministries and offices, 
where clerical and administrative employees are usually women, and senior trade officials 
are predominantly men. While business associations often play an important role in shap-
ing national trade policy, most of the participants in these associations are men, and gen-
der issues are not central to their trade agendas. However, there are a growing number of 
women's business associations in many countries. LouiSE O'REGAN-TARDU, CoMMON-
WEALTH SECRETARIAT, GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN ThADE AND INDUSTRY: A REFERENCE 
MANUAL FOR GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 21-23 (1999). Similar gender 
imbalances exist in multilateral trade bodies. For example, in 2003, only 1 of 16 chairper-
sons of WTO bodies was a woman and only around 11% of experts on the indicative list of 
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concerns among civil society groups in many countries about the 
benefits of further trade liberalization have caused at least some trade 
and commerce ministries to open up the trade policy process through 
some form of public consultation.l75 
The gender assessment study included a number of policy recom-
mendations related to the process for conducting gender or other social 
assessments of trade policy changes and new trade commitments. In 
particular, the study recommended that a wide range of stakeholders be 
involved in the assessment, including non-trade government depart-
ments for labor, education, health, and international development, state 
and local officials, women's organizations, environmental organizations, 
and representatives of indigenous groups, farmers' unions, and com-
munity-based organizations. These stakeholders should also have input 
in the development of trade policy and in monitoring the impacts of 
trade policies and commitments. The study called for improvements in 
the collection of gender-related data-for example, on women's and 
men's employment in export and import-competing industries, and on 
consumption patterns, time use, and control of productive assets within 
households. The study also called for the provision of technical support 
to developing countries to build their own capacities to carry out gen-
der and other social assessments of trade commitments,l76 
panelists to hear WTO trade disputes were women; the first woman was appointed to the 
WTO Appellate Body in November 2003. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO 
Chairpersons for 2003 (Feb. 10, 2003); WTO, Indicative List of Governmental and Non-
Governmental Panelists, WT/DSB/33 (Mar. 6, 2003) (33 of 293 individuals on updated list 
were women); Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Appoints New Appellate 
Body Member and Reappoints Existing Members (Nov. 7, 2003) (appointment of Ms. 
Merit Janow to the Appellate Body). See generally McGill, supra note 138. 
175 In many countries, labor unions and civil society organizations are becoming in-
creasingly active in national debates about trade policy, but women are not always well 
represented in these organizations, and gender concerns are not raised consistently in 
these debates. At the same time, coalitions and networks of women's organizations have 
been intensifying their involvement in civil society activities related to the WTO and re-
gional trade negotiations. See, for example, the websites of the International Gender and 
Trade Network (http:/ /www.igtn.org), the Women's EDGE Coalition (http:/ /www.wo-
mensedge.org), and the Women's Environment and Development Organization (http:/ I 
www.wedo.org). 
176 GAMMAGE ET AL., supra note 141, at 127-28, 130. Similar proposals ha,·e been made 
by the new U.N. interagency task force on gender and trade, other international and re-
gional bodies, development agencies, and civil society networks. See, e.g., WoMEN IN DEVEL-
OPMENT EUROPE, GENDER, TRADE AND RIGHTS: MOVING FORWARD 6-7, 12, 21-26, 43-46 
(Benedicte Allaert & Nicole Forman eds., 1999); ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 26; WILLIAMS, supra note 137, app. 3 (gen-
der mainstreaming initiatives in regional economic bodies). See generally CANADIAN INTERNA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, GENDER EQUALITY AND 'TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILD-
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F. General Observations 
The gender assessment study for the Women's EDGE Coalition 
highlighted the need for further research in a number of areas to de-
termine the precise impact of specific trade and investment policies 
on women in particular countries, sectors, and circumstances. As dis-
cussed in Part III above, the study also noted the need for further 
work on practical tools for conducting gender and other social as-
sessments of trade agreements, including a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative/participatory approaches. 
In the area of legal/regulatory analysis, the study identified cases 
in which trade agreements had been negotiated "gender-blind" or with 
gender concerns as an afterthought. For example, the potential 
conflict identified between the SCM Agreement and export-promotion 
programs for women-owned businesses could easily have been avoided 
if trade negotiators had included an appropriate exception in the 
agreement for "assistance to historically disadvantaged groups" along 
the lines of the "green light" subsidy for "assistance to disadvantaged 
regions." At the same time, the study suggested that current proposals 
to address developing country concerns about the operation of the in-
ternational trading regime-such as the proposal for a "development 
box" to be added to the Agreement on Agriculture-might need to be 
further refined to ensure that women farmers and other marginalized 
groups share in the benefits of the DDA. 
The gender assessment study recommended that industrialized 
countries such as the United States, in formulating their own trade 
policies and commitments, consider the potential impact on women 
and other marginalized groups in developing countries. However, 
each country would still have the primary responsibility for assessing 
the impact of trade and other economic policies within its borders. 
The study also recommended that developing countries should have 
access to trade-related technical assistance funds established under 
the Integrated Framework to finance poverty and social/gender as-
sessments of proposed trade commitments and to monitor the im-
pacts of trade agreements that are already being implemented. 
In terms of timing, the gender assessment study recommended 
that a social/gender assessment be undertaken as early as possible in 
the trade negotiation process and that it be updated periodically as 
lNG: A RESOURCE TooL FOR PRACTITIONERS (2003), http:/ /www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IM-
AGES.NSF /vLUimages/GenderEquality2/$file/WEB-COVER-E.pdf; Gender & Trade Task 
Force Meeting, supra note 140. 
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the negotiation progresses. Part of any assessment should also involve 
the selection of indicators to monitor future impacts. Given their re-
source and capacity constraints, developing country governments and 
civil society groups will need to be selective in the trade policy options 
they choose to assess. (As discussed in Part III above, several countries 
are already on this path, having identified key trade policy reforms to 
examine using PSIA tools.) By drawing on expertise from national 
research institutes and universities rather than international consult-
ants, developing countries can conserve scarce resources while also 
ensuring greater ownership of their trade assessments. 
CoNCLUSION 
Following the collapse of trade negotiations in Candm, uncertain-
ties remain about the direction of the Doha Development Agenda and 
the type of support that development banks and agencies will provide 
to developing countries to engage effectively in this process. In light of 
international and national commitments to meaningful poverty reduc-
tion, it is increasingly important for any new trade commitment to be 
examined carefully from a poverty and social perspective, including 
considerations of gender and other key social categories. It is also im-
portant to encourage the development of a variety of diagnostic tools 
for this type of analysis for use not only by government trade offices 
and development institutions, but also by other government ministries, 
research institutes, universities, and civil society groups. The use of 
these tools by various stakeholders can lead to a fuller and more bal-
anced understanding of the trade commitments under consideration 
and may inspire greater public confidence in the international trading 
system, particularly for developing countries. However, for these tools 
to be useful, developing countries must also have the flexibility to 
choose the trade policy options that best support their poverty reduc-
tion strategies and broad development goals. 
